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I. CIVIL PROCEDURE

A.

Introduction

The previous term of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals was
utilized to determine a myriad of issues surrounding the West Virginia Rules of
Civil Procedure. Among the issues the court was faced with include default
judgment, motion for relief from judgment, res judicata, review of magistrate
court trials by a circuit court, dismissal orders under Rule 44(b) for failure to
prosecute, and several issues surrounding the service of process.
B.

Default Judgment

In Conner v. Pound, Conner, Lucas, Andreozzi, Inc.,1 the court considered the propriety of an entry of default judgment when the parties were in dis1

554 S.E.2d 120 (W. Va. 2001).
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agreement as to whether the defendant had received notice of the suit. Conner
arose out of a wrongful termination suit where the defendant, Mr. Conner's former employer, neglected to answer the summons and complaint. The defendant's counsel entered a special appearance to argue that the defendant had
3
never received a copy of the complaint.
The record revealed that service of the summons and complaint was attempted through the Secretary of State because the defendant was an out-ofstate business, and the return receipt in the record showed "unknown or insufficient address." 4 Nonetheless, the trial court granted plaintiffs motion for default judgment.5 In reversing its decision and vacating the order of default
judgment, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that "[w]hen a
return receipt for service of process is noted 'unknown' or 'insufficient address,'
and no other action has been taken pursuant to the statutory provisions for service, then service of process has not complied with the statutory requirements
6
and will not support a default judgment."
In Cook v. Channel One, Inc 7 the court analyzed the considerations re-8
quired of a trial court faced with a 60(b) motion to vacate a default judgment.
Cook arose out of a traffic accident where the plaintiff filed a John Doe suit alleging that defendant Carole Leasing Corporation (hereinafter "CLC") owned
the vehicle that struck the plaintiff.9 The driver of the car fled the scene. 10 Although service was properly effected through the Secretary of State, CLC did
not file an answer to the complaint and judgment by default was rendered
against it. 11 CLC entered the case to contest the entry of default judgment in the
form of a motion to set aside the judgment under West Virginia Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b), which the circuit court denied.12
The court began its analysis by noting that determining whether a 60(b)
motion should be granted in the face of a default judgment requires a trial court
to consider: "(1) [t]he degree of prejudice suffered by the plaintiff from the delay in answering; (2) the presence of material issues of fact and meritorious de2

See id.

3

See id.

4

See id.

5

See id.

6

Conner v. Pound, Conner, Lucas, Andreozzi, Inc., 554 S.E.2d 120 (W. Va. 2001).

7

549 S.E.2d 306 (W. Va. 2001).

8

See id. at 307.

9

See id.

1o

See id.

I

See id. at 307-08.

12

See id. at 308.
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stake; and (4) the degree of intranfenses; (3) the significance of the interests at
13
sigence on the part of the defaulting party."'
The court found with respect to the first consideration that the plaintiff
would suffer very little prejudice from the vacation of the default judgment order.14 The court ruled that under the second consideration regarding presence of
material issues of fact or meritorious defenses was satisfied because CLC was
disputing a material allegation in the plaintiffs complaint. 15 Under the third
consideration, examining the significance of interest at stake, the court observed
that CLC's interests at stake were high because plaintiff was demanding
$65,000 in economic damages alone. 6 Finally, with regard to the fourth consideration, the court found that CLC's degree of intransigence was hiAh because
it waited until eleven months after the suit was filed to enter the case.
In an attempt to demonstrate excusable neglect on its part, CLC planned
to assert that it forwarded all the pleadings to its insurer and the insurer did not
respond to the complaint in a timely manner. 18 The court noted that it had already observed that a majority of jurisdictions hold that "where an insurance
the
company has misfiled papers, this amounts to excusable neglect."' 19 Thus,
20
standard.
neglect
excusable
stringent
the
met
had
CLC
court found that
Finally, in balancing the interests of both CLC and the plaintiff in light
of the above four factor test, the court found that the trial court had abused its
discretion in failing to grant CLC's 60(b) motion to vacate the default judgorder denying CLC's motion to set aside the default
ment.2 1 As a result, the
22
reversed.
judgment was
C.

Motion for Relief From Judgment

The court was forced to determine the liberality of West Virginia Rule
of Civil Procedure 60(b) in Coffinan v. West Virginia Division of Motor VehiCook v. Channel One, Inc., 549 S.E.2d 306, 309 (W. Va. 2001) (citing State ex rel. United
Mine Workers of America, Local Union 1938 v. Waters, 489 S.E.2d 266, syl. Pt. 2 (W. Va. 1977)
(further citations omitted)).
13

14

See id. at 309.

15

See id. at 309-10 (citing Hinerman v. Levin, 310 S.E.2d 850 (W. Va. 1970)).
See id. at 310.

16
17
18

See id.
See id.

19
Cook v. Channel One, Inc., 549 S.E.2d 306, 310-11 (W. Va. 2001) (quoting Parsons v.
Consolidated Gas Supply Corp., 472 S.E.2d 758, 762 (1979)).
20

See id. at 311.

21

See id.

22

See id.
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cles.23 In Coffinan, the defendant, Douglas M. Coffman, was convicted of sec-

ond offense driving under the influence of alcohol and had his driving privileges
revoked by the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles Commissioner, (hereinafter "the Commissioner"). 2 4 After having his privileges suspended by the
Commissioner, the defendant appealed to the circuit
court, arguing that 25he had
...
not been promptly presented to a magistrate for a preliminary hearing.
The
circuit court held a hearing on the issue and affirmed the decision.
Subsequently, the defendant filed a motion requesting the circuit court to vacate this
decision. 27 By final order on July 18, 2000, the circuit court vacated this order,
finding that the original order was inconsistent with prior rulings on the same
29
28
legal issues in the same court. The Commissioner then appealed this order.
After restating Rule 60(b), the court observed that the record indicated
that the trial court granted defendant's motion because it found that a mistake
had been committed. 30 In its analysis, the court ruled that one of the purposes of
Rule 60(b) is to provide the means for a collateral attack on a final judgment
when certain extraordinary circumstances were present. 3' Further, the court
held that "when such extraordinary circumstances are absent, a collateral attack
is an inappropriate means for attempting to defeat a final judgment in a civil
action. ' 32 The court went onto rule that because this rule is not to be liberally
construed, 3 3 and the prior cases cited as the mistake in the prior holding were
argued at the first hearing, 34 granting a 60(b) motion under these circumstances
was erroneous. 35 As a result, the amended order of the circuit court was reversed anu vacate, and thie Uecision by tlle CuuuuUssloner was reinstated.

23

551 S.E.2d 658 (W. Va. 2001).

24

See id. at 660.

25

See id. at 661.

26

See id.

27

See id. at 662.

28
29

Coffman v. West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles, 551 S.E.2d 658, 665 (W. Va. 2001).
See id. at 661.

30

See id. at 662.

31

See id.

32

Id.

33

See id.

34

Coffman v. West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles, 551 S.E.2d 658, 672 (W. Va. 2001).

35

See id. at 662-63.
See id. at 663.

36
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In Taylor v. Elkins Home Show, 3 7 purchasers of a mobile home from the
defendant complained that the contractor installed the home incorrectly and that
the mobile home was damaged. 38 The plaintiffs filed suit.39 During the trial,
the court denied the retailer's motion for judgment as a matter of law, but
granted a new trial as to one issue on damages.
The retailer filed a West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) motion for reconsideration and then filed
a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. 4 1 The trial court granted the
motion. 4 2 In reviewing the trial court's decision, the supreme court noted that:
In determining whether there is sufficient evidence to support a
jury verdict the court should: (1) consider the evidence most favorable to the prevailing party; (2) assume that all conflicts in
the evidence were resolved by the jury in favor of the prevailing
party; (3) assume as proved all facts which the prevailing
party's evidence tends to prove; and (4) give to the prevailing
party the benefit of all favorable inferences
which reasonably
43
proved.
facts
the
from
drawn
be
may
The court found that the trial court retained its authority to vacate its order granting a new trial and to grant judgment as a matter of law on behalf of the
retailer. 44 Further, the trial court was not required to set forth findings of fact
and conclusions of law in its order under West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure
52(a).4 5 The plaintiffs also failed to produce sufficient evidence on damages to
the property to sustain a verdict on their behalf,
or to show a basis for an award
46
of aggravation and inconvenience damages.

37

558 S.E.2d 611 (W. Va. 2001).

38

See id. at 613.

39

See id.

40

See id. at 614.

41

See id. at 615.

42

See id. at 616.

43

See id. at 615.

44

See id. at 616.

45

See id.

46

See id. at 619.
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Res Judicata

In Willard v. Whited,4 7 the court was forced to apply the doctrine of res
judicata to the West Virginia Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act. This case
involved former litigation where a widower took his intestate share pursuant to
West Virginia Code section 42-3-1 in lieu of the amount he was bequeathed
under the will.4 8 Accordingly, the circuit court below appointed a special administrator to make the determination of the widower's intestate share, which
was approved by the circuit court by order dated August 6, 1998. 49 The widower died sometime later, and the executor of the widower's estate filed a motion for relief from judgment for the court to "fix and determine certain matters
pertaining to the special commissioner's report. ' 5° The circuit court found that
because the judgment in that case had been in effect for over one year, it5 1no
longer had subject matter jurisdiction over the matter and denied the motion.
The widower's executor then filed a second civil suit under the Uniform
Declaratory Judgments Act 5 2 and alleged that his estate was entitled to certain
credits or offsets of the elective share amount found in the special commissioner's report. 53 The executor for the widower's wife's estate filed a motion to
dismiss, alleging that the case should be dismissed pursuant to the doctrine of
res judicata, which was granted by the circuit court.5 4 This appeal followed.
After restating the elements for res judicata, 55 the court found that there
was a "final adjudication on the merits in the previous action," that the case involved the same parties as the previous action had, and that "the issue presented
47

No. 29372, 2001 WL 1525000, at *2 (W. Va. Nov. 30, 2001).

48

See id.

49

See id.

5o

Id.

51

Id.

52

See W. VA. CODE § 55-13-1 (2001).

53

See Willard v. Whited, No. 29372, 2001 WL 1525000, at *2 (W. Va. Nov. 30, 2001).

54

See id. at *3.

55

See id. The court restated the following elements that must be met before a lawsuit may be
barred under the theory of res judicata:
First, there must have been a final adjudication on the merits in the prior action by a court having jurisdiction of the proceedings. Second, the two actions
must involve either the same parties or persons in privity with those same parties. Third, the cause of action identified for resolution in the subsequent proceeding either must be identical to the cause of action determined in the prior
action or must be such that it could have been resolved, had it been presented,
in the prior action.
See id. (quoting Blake v. Charleston Area Medical Ctr., 498 S.E.2d 41, syl. pt. 4 (W. Va. 1997)).
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in this case could have been resolved had it been presented in the prior action. ' 56 The court noted that, pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment in previous litigation by a court having subject matter jurisdiction and involving the same parties with similar issues is final and conclusive. 57 Further,
the court held:
It is not essential that the matter should have been formally put
in issue in a former suit, but it is sufficient that the status of the
suit was such that the parties might have had the matter disposed on its merits. An erroneous ruling of the court
will not
58
prevent the previous matter from being res judicata.
After holding that a collateral attack through the use of declaratory
judgment action after the doctrine of res judicata
has attached is not permissible,
59
the judgment of the lower court was affirmed.
E.

Appeal From Circuit Court OrderRemanding Action Back to Magistrate Court

In Wolfe v. Welton,60 the court was faced with an appeal from a circuit
court order granting a new trial in magistrate court. 6 1 This case was originally
filed in magistrate court and involved a dispute over repair costs to a used car
under the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act. 62 The magistrate
court entered judgment to the defendant-car owner after a jury verdict in his
favor. 63 As a result of this initial appeal to circuit court, the circuit court reversed the judgment of the magistrate court and remanded the case. 64 Before a
new trial could be held, the65defendant-car owner appealed to the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals.

56

See id. at *3.

57
58

See Willard v. Whited, No. 29372, 2001 WL 1525000, at *2 (W. Va. Nov. 30, 2001).
See id.

59

See id.

60

558 S.E.2d 363 (W. Va. 2001).

61

See id. at 366.

62

See id.

63

See id.

64

See id. at 367.

65

Wolfe v. Welton, 558 S.E.2d 363, 367 (W. Va. 2001).
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While ultimately disposing the case on substantive grounds, 66 the court
held that "this court is vested with jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a circuit
court judgment reversing the judgment of the magistrate court in a matter heard
there on the merits, notwithstanding the fact that the order also undertakes to
67
remand the case to the magistrate court for a new trial or other proceedings."
The court also observed that the circuit court's standard of review of the magistrate court judgment is de novo only to a civil case heard by the magistrate court
sitting without a jury. 68 Thus, because this case involved a magistrate jury trial
and the circuit court still used a de novo standard of review, the circuit court
committed error.69
F.

Failureto Prosecute

In Anderson v. King, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's dismissal of the plaintiff's case for the failure to prosecute. 7 1 The plaintiff filed suit against an attorney that he hired to perform a title
search to property that the plaintiff purchased. 7 2 The plaintiff claimed that the
attorney negligently performed the title search and consequently, the plaintiff
73
lost his property.
The court found that the circuit court abused its discretion because there
was evidence that the plaintiff had taken substantial action to prosecute his
case. 74 Previous delays were the result of the circuit court continuing the action

Justice Davis filed a rather vigorous concurring opinion, arguing that the case should have
been reversed solely on procedural grounds given the multitude of errors committed by the circuit
court. See id. (Davis, J., concurring).
67
See id. at 374.
66

See id. at 371. West Virginia Code section 50-5-12(d) provides that the standard of review
by a circuit court hearing an appeal from magistrate court sitting without a jury is de novo. See W.
VA. CODE § 50-5-12(d) (2001).
69
See id. Although the court held that the circuit court erred by utilizing this standard of
review, the court does not appear to provide any guidance on what the appropriate standard is
when a circuit court is faced with an appeal of a magistrate action that involved a jury trial. See
id.
68

70

556 S.E.2d. 815 (W. Va. 2001).

71

See id. at 815-16.

72

See id. at 815.

73

See id. at 816.

74

See id. at 817.
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sua sponte.75 Additionally, the plaintiffs original attorney left his76firm and
action.
never received the circuit court's notice of intent to dismiss the
The circuit court dismissed the action pursuant to West Virginia Code
section 56-8-9, which permits a court, in its discretion, to dismiss any proceeding where77there has been no order or proceeding but to continue it for more than
one year. Rule 41(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure supplements the statutory provision and permits the court, on motion, to reinstate on its
trial docket any case within three terms after entry of the order of dismissal or
nonsuit.7 8 Dismissal for failure to prosecute is "a harsh sanction ...and should
be considered appropriate only in flagrant cases." 79 "[I]f a party showed good
cause for not prosecuting an action, the court should not reinstate the action if
substantial prejudice would result to the other party." 80 The court found that the
plaintiffs conduct was not flagrant and that he showed good cause reasons for
not prosecuting the case. 8 1 Additionally, the court found that the defendant
case.82
would not be substantially prejudiced by reinstating the plaintiff's
In Howerton v. Tri-State Salvage,83 the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals reversed the circuit court's order to dismiss the plaintiff's case for the
failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. 84 The plaintiffs counsel claimed that neither the notice of intent to dismiss nor the dismissal86order were received. 85 Accordingly, the plaintiff moved
to reinstate the action.
Before a case may be dismissed under Rule 41(b), the following guidelines should be followed: "First, when a circuit court is contemplating dismissing an action under Rule 41(b), the court must first send a notice of its intent to
do so to all counsel of record and to any parties who have appeared and do not
have counsel of record. ' 87 Second, any party opposing such motion shall serve
75

See id.

76

See id. at 818.

77

See id. at 817.

78

See id.

79
80

Id. (quoting Dimon v. Mansey, 479 S.E.2d 339, 344 (W. Va. 1996)).
Id. (quoting Dimon, 479 S.E.2d at 344-45).

81

See id.

82

See id. at 818.

83

557 S.E.2d 287 (W. Va. 2001).

84

See id. at 289-90.

85

See id. at 288.

86

See id.

87

Howerton v. Tri-State Salvage, Inc., 557 S.E.2d 287, 289 (W. Va. 2001).
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upon the court and the opposing counsel a response to such motion within fifteen days of the service of such motion, or appear and resist such motion if it be
sooner set for hearing. 88 Third, if no motion is made opposing dismissal, or if a
motion is made and is not set for hearing by either party, the court may decide
the issue upon the existing record after expiration of the time for serving a motion and any reply. 89 Fourth, the plaintiff bears the burden of going forward
with evidence as to good cause for not dismissing the action; if the plaintiff does
come forward with good cause, the burden then shifts to the defendant to show
substantial prejudice to it in allowing the case to proceed; if the defendant does
show substantial prejudice, then the burden of production shifts to the plaintiff
to establish that the proffered good cause outweighs the prejudice to the defendant. 90 Fifth, the court, in weighing the evidence of good cause and substantial
prejudice, should also consider "(1) the actual amount of time involved in the
dormancy of the case, (2) whether the plaintiff made any inquiries to his or her
counsel about the status of the case during the period of dormancy, and (3) other
relevant factors bearing on good cause and substantial prejudice." 9 1 Sixth, if a
motion opposing dismissal has been served, the court shall make written findings, and issue a written order which, if adverse to the plaintiff, shall be appealable to this court as a final order; if the order is adverse to the defendant, an appeal on the matter may only be taken in conjunction with the final judgment
order terminating the case from the docket. 92 Seventh, if the plaintiff does not
prosecute an appeal of an adverse decision to this court within the period of time
provided by our rules and statutes, the plaintiff may proceed under Rule 41(b)'s
three-term rule to seek reinstatement of the case by the circuit COUrt.9 3 Eight,
should a plaintiff seek reinstatement under Rule 41(b), the burden of going forward with the evidence and the burden of persuasion shall be the same as if the
plaintiff had responded to the court's initial notice, and a ruling on reinstatement
94
shall be appealable.
The court found that although the injured arty was less than diligent in
prosecuting his case, dismissal was unwarranted. 5 The plaintiff's interest in

8

See id.

89

See id.

90

See id.

91

See id.

92

Howerton v. Tri-State Salvage, Inc., 557 S.E.2d 287, 289-90 (W. Va. 2001).

93

See id. at 290.

94

See id.

95

See id.
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moving forward with his claim outweighed concerns
96 for judicial efficiency and
any prejudice that the defendant may have suffered.
G.

Service of Process

In Kelley v. Toyota,97 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's order to dismiss the plaintiff's case under Rule 4(k) of
the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. 98 Rule 4(k) states in pertinent part:
Time Limit for Service.--If service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a defendant within 120 days after the
filing of the complaint, the court, upon motion or on its own initiative after notice to the plaintiff, shall dismiss the action without prejudice as to that defendant or direct that service be effective within a specified time; provided that if the plaintiff shows
good cause for the failure, the court
shall extend the time for
99
service for an appropriate period.
The plaintiffs attorney timely submitted a fee for service to the Circuit
Clerk's Office with the understanding that it would be forwarded to the Secretary of State's Office. 10 0 Although the fee was inadequate, the Circuit Clerk
failed to notify the attorney in a timely fashion. 101
102 Relying on State ex rel. CharlestonArea Medical Center, Inc. v. Kaufman, the court stated that dismissal is not mandatory if a plaintiff shows good
cause for not having effected service of the summons and complaint in a timely
manner. 10 3 In this case, the attorney promptly moved to correct the problem
when it came to his attention. 104 Consequently, the court held that under these
circumstances, the plaintiff demonstrated good cause for failing to perfect service of process.105
J. ChristopherGardill
96

See id.

97
98

557 S.E.2d 315 (W. Va. 2001).
See id. at 315.

99

See id. at 318 (citing W. VA. R. Civ. P. 4(k)).

100

See id.

101

See id.

102

475 S.E.2d 374 (W. Va. 1996).
See id. at 374.

103

104
105

See Kelley, 557 S.E.2d at 315.
See id.
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II.

A.

COMMERCIAL LAW

Introduction

In 2001, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals and the West
Virginia Legislature made several modifications to West Virginia's commercial
law. It is the intent of this survey to briefly summarize many of the significant
modifications. These various alterations include court decisions regarding judicial interference with business management, interpretation of "liens" under the
West Virginia Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act, and modifications to the West
Virginia tax code. The legislature also modified the tax code, including a bill
favoring clean fuel technology, and enacted the Uniform Athlete Agents Act.
Additionally, this survey will note the other significant changes in corporate
law.
B.

CorporateLaw

In State ex rel. Smith v. Evans,106 the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals considered whether a circuit court has the authority, through an equitable remedy, to reinstate a corporate officer after his termination upon recommendation of the board of directors of the sole shareholder. 107 The court held
that in the ahsnre of frand conduct amounting to fraud, or oppressive conduct
by the majority shareholder, the corporation had the uncontrollable right to
manage the corporation. Furthermore, the court was without power to grant an
equitable remedy that in essence exerted control over the management of0 8the
corporation or prevented its officers from performing their corporate duties.1
The court applied well-recognized principles of corporate law to resolve
the issue presented in the case. However, to understand the application of the
principles, a brief restatement of the pertinent facts is necessary. Larry D. Smith
was the president of Petroleum, Inc. 10 Petroleum, Inc. was the wholly-owned
subsidiary of Smith, Inc." 0 Larry D. Smith, Eddie B. Smith, and Donald P.
Smith are the three equal shareholders of Smith, Inc. and comprised its board of
1
directors. 1
16

547 S.E.2d 278 (W. Va. 2001).

107

See id. at 278.

108

Id. at 282.

109

Id.at 281.
Id.

110

III Id.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol104/iss3/9

14

Gardill et al.: Survey of Developments in the Law of West Virginia: 2001 Part One

2002]

DEVELOPMENTS IN WEST VIRGINIA LAW

On April 2, 1999, Larry D. Smith filed a shareholder derivative suit in
circuit court against the individual petitioners in the case and Smith, Inc., alleging that Eddie B. and Donald P. Smith converted assets, breached fiduciary duties, engaged in fraud and misrepresentation, and were unjustly enriched as a
result of these activities. 112 Subsequently, on March 2, 2001, Smith, Inc., acting
through its President Eddie B. Smith and through its board of directors, removed
Larry D. Smith from his positions of president of Petroleum, Inc. and director of
Smith, Inc.'" 3 On the same day, petitioners moved the circuit court to confirm
the removal of Larry D. Smith as President of Petroleum, Inc. and as director of
Smith, Inc."14 In the circuit court's order, dated April 4, 2001, among other
things, the court ordered the reinstatement of Larry D. Smith as president of
Petroleum, Inc. and enjoined Eddie B. and Donald P. Smith from interfering
with the operations of Petroleum, Inc. during the subsequent pendency of the
litigation. 115 It is from this order that the petitioners sought a writ of prohibition
challenging the circuit court's authority to issue that portion of its April 4, 2001,
order.
The court began its analysis by examining existing corporate law as interpreted by the West Virginia courts. First, in syllabus point 1 of Smiley v. New
River, the court stated:
The majority of the stockholders of a solvent going corporation,
in the absence of fraud, or conduct amounting to fraud, and so
long as they keep within their charter, have uncontrollable right
to manage the corporate affairs, and a court of equity will not
interfere at the instance of a minority or the stockholders, by receivers16 or otherwise, to control corporate acts or manage1
ment.
Furthermore, the court similarly recognized that in the absence of fraud,
the corporation retains the power to remove its officers and directors 117 "whenever in its judgment the best interests of the corporation will be served
thereby."' 118 Similarly, absent statutory authority, a court lacks jurisdiction to

112

Id.

13

Id.

114

Id.

115

Id. at 282.

116

Smiley v. New River, 77 S.E. 976, syl. pt. I (W. Va. 1913).

117

Id. at 282; see also 2 Fletcher Cycolpedia Corp. § 358 (1998).

118

W. VA. CODE § 31-1-104(b) (1975).
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grant injunctions restraining a corporation's officers from performing their duties, as this would have the same practical effect of removal. 119
Larry D. Smith offered in support of his argument that the reinstatement
and related orders were within the circuit court's authority, because when a finding of "oppressive conduct" is supported, the court has the power to grant equitable relief. 12 The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals stated that when a
board of directors violates the fiduciary duty of good faith or fair dealing it owes
the shareholders, a finding of "oppressive conduct" is warranted. 12 1 Furthermore, the court noted that an attempt "to freeze or squeeze out a minority shareholder from deriving any benefit from his investment in a private business corporation, without
any legitimate business purpose, may constitute oppressive
' 22
conduct.

'

However, the court noted that there was no indication in the record of
the circuit court of a finding of "oppressive conduct."' 12 3 Thus, the court applied the traditional principles of corporate law as articulated in Smiley and
Harkey. Accordingly, the court found that the factual record before it was void
of any fraud or conduct amounting to fraud, and because no evidence of oppressive conduct was adduced at trial, the circuit court was without power to invade
a properly effected business decision and reinstate
Larry D. Smith to president
124
of Petroleum, Inc. and director of Smith, Inc.
In conclusion, the court stressed the principle that, even in the situation
where one corporation is wholly-owned by a single shareholder, in the absence
of fraud-like conduct or breach of fiduciary duty, a court is without power to
invade the province of a corporation's board of directors' decision and alter a
properly carried out business decision of the corporation. 125

See Harkey v. Mobley 552 S.W.2d 70 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that only a corporation
has the power of a motion). The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has held that a motion
is "the removal of an officer in a corporation from his office." Richards v. Town of Clarksburg, 4
S.E. 774 (W. Va. 1887).
120 See Masinter v. WEBCO, Co., 262 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1980) (holding that where "oppres119

sive conduct" is proven, an exception to the general rule that courts will not interfere in the management of a corporation is warranted; therein, the court identified multiple equitable remedies
that it may grant to a party that has suffered because of the oppressive conduct).
121 Id. at syl. pt. 3.
122

Id. at syl. pt. 4.

123

Smith, 547 S.E.2d at 283.

124

Id. at 285.

125

See id.
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"Liens" Under the West Virginia Uniform FraudulentTransfers Act

In Nicholas Loan & Mortgage, Inc. v. W.Va. Coal Co-Op, Inc., 126 the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals considered whether the voluntary
creation of a lien could constitute a "fraudulent transfer" under the West Virginia Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act, codified in the West Virginia Code
sections 40-1A-1 et seq. (the "Act"). 127 The court held that where a debtor, after
a suit is initiated against it by a creditor, allowed liens to be filed against substantially all of its assets giving a security interest in said assets to an insider, as
defined in the Act, a "transfer" had occurred under the Act. 128 Furthermore,
sufficient facts existed in the record to create a genuine issue of material fact
precluding the circuit court's granting of summary judgment holding that a
"fraudulent transfer" had not occurred. 129
The dispute involved a loan made on September 18, 1995, by Nicholas
Loan & Mortgage, Inc. ("Nicholas Loan") to William A. Ray, individually and
on behalf of W. Va. Coal Co-Op, Inc. ("Coal Co-Op"), in his capacity as general
manger, in the amount of $63,956.83 (the "Loan"). 130 Nicholas Loan is a lending institution operating in Summersville, West Virginia. 13 1 Coal Co-Op, a
West Virginia corporation owned by Gail Ray, wife of William A. Ray, buys,
refurbishes, and sells mining equipment. 132 Shortly after the loan was
made,
13 3
Loan.
the
of
repayment
discontinued
Ray
A.
William
and
Co-Op
Coal
On September 18, 1996, Nicholas Loan filed suit against Coal Co-Op
and William A. Ray to collect the unpaid portion of the Loan. 134 On March 27,
1998, the Secretary of State accepted service of process on behalf of Coal CoOp. 13 5 Thereafter, on April 2, 1998, Gail Ray executed three promissory notes
(the "Promissory Notes") payable to Dr. David Ray, her son, on behalf of several parties for various amounts of money totaling $85,000.136 Gail Ray executed notes obligating Coal Co-Op, Ray Sales (another family company con126

547 S.E.2d 234 (W. Va. 2001).

127

See id. at 239.

128

Id. at 239.

129

Id. at 241.

130

Id. at 235.

131

Id.

132

Id.

133

Id. at 236.
Id.

134

Id. (explaining that for an unknown administrative reasons, the West Virginia Secretary of
State refused to accept service of process for Coal Co-Op when service was previously attempted).
135

136

Id.
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trolled by Gail Ray) and herself personally to Dr. Ray. 137 Following the execution of the promissory notes, on April 8, 1998, three liens were filed in the
Nicholas County Courthouse granting Dr. Ray ,138
a security interest in virtually all
of Coal Co-Op, Ray Sales, and Gail Ray's assets.
The lien at issue in the
present case was the lien pledging the assets of Coal Co-Op for the repayment of
the promissory notes. 139 Dr. Ray testified that these liens secured multiple loans
he had made to his
parents and their businesses throughout the 1990s, which had
14 0
not been repaid.

Nicholas Loan subsequently filed a new complaint alleging that the defendants entered into a scheme violating the Act and that the liens were filed
with the intent to delay, hinder or defraud its rights. 4 1 The defendants responded that the liens only created a security interest in the property but fell
short of a "transfer" prohibited by the Act. 14 2 Thus, the court was left to resolve
whether a lien filed after a suit had been instituted against the debtor, granting
an insider, as defined in the Act, a security interest in virtually all of the debtor's
assets constituted a "fraudulent transfer" under the Act.
The court began its analysis by examining the definitions given "lien"
and "transfer" in the Act. 14 3 "Lien" is defined as "a charge against or an interest
in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation, and
includes a security interest created by agreement."' 144 "Transfer" is later defined
as "every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and includes payment
of money, rAs, lea P annd rrPati n of a lien or other encum,145
brance."
The court found that the language of the statute was unambiguous
and, thus, held that the plain meaning is to be accepted without resorting to principles of statutory interpretation. 146 Thereafter, the court reasoned that "lien"
137

Id.

138

Id.

139

Id. (stating that the lien pledged as security "all of the debtor's [Coal Co-Op] inventory,

now owned or hereafter acquired, and wherever located, including without limitation, accounts
receivable, cash, contract rights, and general intangibles").
140

Id.

141

Id. at 237.

142

Id.

143

Id. at 238.

144
W. VA. CODE § 40-lA-1(h) (1986) (defining the term as it was understood when the West
Virginia Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act was adopted by the West Virginia Legislature in 1986
and remains to be understood presently).
145
W. Va. CODE § 40-1A-1(1) (1986) (emphasis added).
W6

Nicholas Loan & Mortgage, Inc., 547 S.E.2d at 238; see also State v. Jarvis, 487 S.E.2d 293

(W. Va. 1997).
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under the Act includes the consensual creation of a security interest in the property of a debtor to secure the repayment of a debt.14 7 Furthermore, the creation
of a lien or other such encumbrance on the debtor's assets constitutes a "transfer" under the Act.148 Thus, the remaining question for the court was whether
the transfer determined to have taken place between Gail Ray and Dr. Ray was
"fraudulent" under the Act.
The Act provides that a creditor may prove a transfer fraudulent by
showing that the debtor acted with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a credi150
tor.149 The court reasoned that because the transfer was made to an insider,

after Gail Ray and Coal Co-Op had been sued by Nicholas Loan, and that the
transfer represented substantially all of the debtor's assets, then there was sufficient evidence suggesting that the defendant's intended to hinder, delay, or defraud Nicholas Loan. 15 1 Therefore, because these facts are substantially the
same as several factors listed in section 4(b) of the Act, a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the transfer was "fraudulent" under the Act, thus
precluding the granting of summary judgment in favor of the defendant's by the
circuit court.15 2 The court then reversed the order of the circuit court.

The holding of this case clearly states that the creation of a lien is considered a transfer under the Act and depending upon the facts surrounding the
creation of a lien, a fact-finder may conclude that such transfer was fraudulent
and accordingly set the transfer aside to protect the interests of existing creditors, secured or unsecured.
D.

Taxation
1.

Case Law
a.

RGIS Inventory Specialists v. Palmer

In RGIS Inventory Specialists v. Palmer,153 the issue was whether the
actual electronic recording of inventory is exempt from West Virginia's sales
147

NicholasLoan & Mortgage,Inc., 547 S.E.2d at 238.

148

Id.

149

See W. VA. CODE § 40-1A-4(a) (1986); See also W. Va. CODE § 40-1A-4(b) (1986) (listing

numerous factors to be considered by the court when determining whether a challenged transfer is
fraudulent under the Act and susceptible of being set aside by the court).
150
Defined by the Act as "a relative of the debtor" or when the debtor is a corporation, "a
relative of a person in control of the debtor. W. VA. CODE § 40-1A-l(g)(1)(i) and -1(g)(2)(vi)
(1986).
151 Nicholas Loan & Mortgage, Inc., 547 S.E.2d at 240.
152

Id.

153 544 S.E.2d 79 (W. Va. 2001).
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tax.154 According to the West Virginia Code, "[s]ales of electronic data proc155
essing services and related software" is exempt from the state sales tax.
"Electronic data processing services" is defined as :
(A) The processing of another's data, including all processes
incident to processing of data such as keypunching, keystroke
verification, rearranging or sorting of previously documented
data for the purpose of data entry or automatic processing and
changing the medium on which data is sorted,.. . and (B) providing access to computer equipment for the purpose of processing data or examining or acquiring data stored in or accessible to the computer equipment.I5
RGIS argued that under the plain meaning of this statute its services
(i.e., taking inventory for businesses) are exempt from sales tax, because taking
the inventory is incidental to the processing of the data. 157 The Tax Commissioner argued that RGIS was not processing data when it takes inventory, but
rather creating data. Therefore, the court was required to determine what in fact
158
the customer was buying and what was incidental to the purchase in this case.
The court began its analysis with the principal that "where a person
claims an exemption from a law imposing a ... tax, such law is strictly con-

strued against the person claiming the exemption." 159 The court reasoned that in
160
the stntute "'data' is something that is initially 'documented' in one form."
To bolster this argument, the court relied upon a Minnesota Court of Appeals
decision to further explain that mental impressions or thoughts are not data until
they have been recorded. 16 1 Thus, the court concluded that the individual items
on the shelves being counted by RGIS's staff are not data, nor did the legislature
intend for individual items to be considered data. The court then held that RGIS
had not proven that its activity was within the exemption because, its inventory
activity (i.e., the actual act of taking the inventory) was not
"the processing of
162
another's data," but rather "the creation of another's data."
154

See id.

155

W. VA. CODE § 11-15-9(a)(22) (1997) (emphasis added).

156

Id.

157

RGIS Inventory Specialists, 544 S.E.2d at 83-84.

158

Id. at 82 (citing W. VA. CODE ST. R. § 110-15-76.1.1).

159

Id. (quoting Shawnee Bank Inc. v. Paige, 488 S.E.2d. 20, syl. pt. 4 (W. Va. 1997)).

160

Id. at 85.

161

Id. at 86 (citing Keezer v. Spickard 493 N.W.2d 614 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993)).

162

Id.at 87.
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b.

Syncor International Corp. v. Palmer

Syncor International Corp. v. Palmer163 raised the issue of whether the
sale of unit doses of nuclear medicine, or radiopharmaceuticals, is exempt from
the state sales tax. 164 Under existing state law "[s]ales of drugs dispensed upon
prescription and sales of insulin to consumers for medical purposes" are exempt
from the state sales tax.165 Syncor International Corp. ("Syncor") sells radiopharmaceuticals, or nuclear medicines. Syncor's "core" sales "involve[] unit
doses of radiopharmaceuticals prepared for a particular,
individual patient pur166
suant to the prescription of that patient's physician."
The Tax Commissioner argued that these "core" sales are not exempt
from the sales tax for two reasons. First, the statutory language exempts the sale
"when the patient directly buys and self-administers a 'drug."' 16 7 Therefore, the
sales should not be exempt because the hospital is the buyer and the drug is not
self-administered by the patient. Second, state regulations, written by the state
tax department, do not exempt drugs "sold to hospitals ...which are to be consumed in the performance of a professional service."' 16 8 Thus, all sales of nuclear medicines are taxable, because the medicine is always consumed in the
performance of a professional service. Syncor argued that the tax department
had exceeded its authority by changing the statutory framework, as West Virginia Code section 11-15-9(a)(1 1) does not make a distinction between self administration or professional administration of the pharmaceutical. 16 9 Syncor
argued that the state tax department did not have the power to alter the exemption under the statute with a regulation, because the regulations are not to
change the statutory framework.
The court began its analysis by stating, "Where the language of a statue
is free from ambiguity, its plain meaning is to be accepted and applied without
resort to interpretation." ' 17 The court reasoned that the statutory exemption was
clear, and held that the statute does exempt the sale of nuclear medicines "purchased and dispensed pursuant to a hysician's prescription that was prepared
for a particular, individual patient."
The court explained that the Tax Coi163

542 S.E.2d 479 (W. Va. 2001).

164

See id.

165

W. VA. CODE § 1 1-I5-9(a)(1 1) (1997).

166

Syncor Int'l Corp., 542 S.E.2d at 481.

167

Id. at 482.

168

Id. (quoting W. VA. CODE ST. R. § 110-15-92.2).

169

Id. at 483.

170

Id. (quoting Crockett v. Andrews, 172 S.E.2d 384, syl. pt. 2 (W. Va. 1970)).

171

Id. at 484.
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missioner's arguments were wrong, because the exemption did not depend on
who purchased the drug nor on who administered it.
c.

Citizens Bank of Weston, Inc. v. City of Weston

172
In the recent case of Citizens Bank of Weston, Inc. v. City of Weston,
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals analyzed the city of Weston's municipal business and occupation tax ("B&O tax"), to determine whether its application to the Citizens
•• 173 Bank of Weston violated the state and federal equal
protection provisions.
Citizens argued that the B&O tax "should not be upheld because the rate setting among the various business classes was performed
arbitrarily and capriciously and because the rate setting lack[ed] a rational basis." 174 At the center of this contention was Citizens' allegation that the term
"similar" in the statute, which conferred upon the municipality the power to
enact the tax, 17 5 "requires any municipality that institutes a B&O tax to follow
the exact same rate-setting and rate-to-class structure that was imposed by the
state under its B&O tax system prior to its repeal on July 1, 1987."1 76
In refuting this argument, the court interpreted the statutory phrase
"similar business and occupation tax,"' 177 not to mean that any municipal tax
enacted pursuant to the statute must be identical in rate and structure to the former state B&O tax, but instead to refer to "a similar kind of tax, i.e., a tax in the
' 178 Additionally, the court
nature
of a e~giL...
B&O tax."
also upheld the constitutional:~ ..
tw dlpnte its tnxing nower to muinicinalities.17 9
.. '

Citizens next contended that the B&O tax had a disproportionate impact
upon it and thus violated state and federal equal protection provisions. The court
recognized that "equal protection of the law is implicated when
a classification
180
treats similarly situated persons in a disadvantageous manner."
172

544 S.E.2d 72 (W. Va. 2001).

173

Id. at 72.

174

Id. at 76.

175

W. VA. CODE § 8-13-5(a) (2000) ("Whenever any business activity or occupation, for which

the state imposed its annual business and occupation or privilege tax under article thirteen ...
chapter eleven of this code, prior to July one, one thousand nine hundred eighty-seven, is engaged
in or carried on within the corporate limits of any municipality, the governing body thereof shall
have plenary power and authority, unless prohibited by general law, to impose a similar business
and occupation tax thereon for the use of the municipality.").
176
Citizens Bank of Weston, Inc., 544 S.E.2d at 76.
177

W. VA. CODE § 8-13-5(a).

178

Citizens Bank of Weston Inc., 544 S.E.2d at 77 n. 12.

179

Id. at 77.

Id. (citing Israel ex rel. Israel v. West Virginia Secondary Sch. Activities Comm'n, 388
S.E.2d 480, syl. pt. 2 (W. Va. 1989)).
180
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Citizens supported its disproportionate impact argument by asserting
that it would be paying seventy percent of the tax while only participating in
fifty percent of Weston's banking business. 8 1 In dismissing Citizens contentions, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals relied on a United States
Supreme Court decision in which the Court refused to allow a disparate-impact
analysis with regard to the equal protection clause. 82 "[A]bsent proof of discriminatory purpose, a law or official act does not8 3violate the Constitution
'solely because it has a... disproportionate impact.""1
d.

Coordinating Council For Independent Living, Inc. v.
Palmer

In Coordinating Council ForIndependent Living, Inc. v. Palmer,14 the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals upheld a circuit court's ruling on the
inapplicability of a privilege tax to homemaker and case management services. 85 The statute at issue in this case imposes a tax of five percent of the6
gross value of health care services provided, on the provider of the service.1
At the center of the dispute is whether the phrase "health care services" may
properly be read to include either homemaker or case management services. 17
Homemaker and case management services are funded through the
West Virginia Medicaid program, and provide home health services as an alternative to residential care for elderly and disabled persons. 8 8 The court, using a
de novo standard of review, admitted the statute was ambiguous, and that, therefore, it should be construed to ascertain the intent of the legislature before being
applied. 189
The court proceeded to analyze the statute by first recognizing that the
word "certain" in the phrase "certain health care services," clearly shows that
the legislature
intended to tax only particular health care services, not all of
190,,,
them.
Additionally, "home health services" means, and is limited to, behav181

Id. at 77 (noting that Citizens argued that the discrepancy is because its competitors report

income at branches outside of Weston).
182
Id. (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)).
183

Id. (citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 375 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting

Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976))).
194

546 S.E.2d 454 (W. Va. 2001).

186

Id. at 464.
W. Va.CODE § 11-13A-3 (1999).

187

CoordinatingCouncilfor IndependentLiving, Inc., 546 S.E.2d at 461.

188

Id. at 457.

189

Id. at 461.

190

Id.

85
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ioral health services and community care services. 19 1 The inquiry then turned to
the definition of community care services, since behavioral health services were
not at issue. 192 The court noted that it was troubled by the "lack of clarity as to
the precise nature of 'community care services, '' 19 3 but admitted that it did not
contemplate services rendered by home health agencies. 194 With no definition
for either homemaker or case management services, the court relied on the expression "inclusio unius est exclusio alterius," or "the inclusion of one is the
exclusion of the others."' 195 That doctrine "informs courts to exclude from opin the list of elements that are given effect expressly
eration those not included
196
by statutory language."
Combining that tool of statutory construction with the policy of construing ambiguities in the tax laws in favor of the taxpayer, 197 the court held that the
privilege tax levied upon health care servicel providers does not apply to case
management services or homemaker services.
Additionally, the court observed that it was troubled by "the draconian
the tax law which
suddenly began enforcing
manner in which the Commissioner
....
,199
The court then prohad been dormant since its adoption five years earlier.
ceeded to find that the procedure the Commissioner implemented to collect the
tax was required to comply with the Administrative Procedures Act. 20 Because
the Commissioner did not follow the "requisite mandates for formal proposal,
of
approval, adoption, etc.," of agency rulemaking, his "attempted20enforcement
1
ineffective."
and
void
was
tax
providers
services
the health care
e.

Frantz v. Palmer

In the recent case of Frantz v. Palmer,2 02 the West Virginia Supreme
20 3
Court of Appeals considered the constitutionality of a statutory provision.
191 W. VA. CODE § 1 1-13A-3(c).
192

CoordinatingCouncilfor Independent Living, Inc., 546 S.E.2d at 462.

193

Id.

194

Id.

195 Id. (citing State ex rel. Roy Allen S. v. Stone, 474 S.E.2d 554, 560 n.11 (W. Va. 1996)).
19

Id.

197 Id. at 463 (citing State ex rel. Lambert v. Carman, 116 S.E.2d 265 (W. Va. 1960)).
198

Id.

199 Id.
200

Id.

201

Id. at 464.

202

Frantz v. Palmer, No. 29178, 2001 WL 1566731 (W. Va. Oct. 29, 2001).
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The statute at issue reposes sole discretion in the Tax Commissioner with regard
to issuance of a certification of adequate assets sufficient to secure performance
in lieu of the appeal bond otherwise required by the statute. 204 The taxpayer
challenged the legislative decision to grant the Tax Commissioner the sole authority to dispense with the bond requirement on the grounds that the legislature
violated the state constitutional guarantee of open access to the courts by its
enactment of the statute. 205 The taxpayer argued that the circuit court should
have the ultimate authority to modify or waive the bond required for an appeal
under the statute.
The court, analogizing to both criminal 20 6 and tax law, 207 held that the
provision violated the constitutional guarantee of open access to the courts by
omitting any provision for judicial review of the Tax Commissioner's decision.
The court further reasoned that anyone "who otherwise complies with the statutory requirements for requesting a waiver of the appeal bond requirement, is
entitled to apply to the• circuit
court for a review of any adverse determination
208
concerning bond waiver."
However, a litigant who seeks a waiver of an appeal bond within the ninety-day statutory period after the filing of the appeal,
must seek judicial review of the Tax Commissioner's decision within that same
ninety day period.
2.

Statutory Changes
a.

Senate Bill 650

Recently, the West Virginia Legislature, in an apparent effort to broaden
the tax base, amended West Virginia Code section 11-15-2 to include construction management within the definition of contracting for sales and use tax purposes. 209 According to the amended section, a "construction manager" is "a
203

W. VA. CODE

§

11-10-10(d) (1986) ("Notwithstanding the aforegoing and in lieu of such

bond, the tax commissioner, in his discretion upon such terms as he may prescribe, may upon a
sufficient showing by the taxpayer, certify to the clerk of the circuit court that the assets of the
taxpayer subject to the lien imposed by section twelve [§ 11-10-12] of this article, or other indemnification, are adequate to secure performance of the orders of the court.").
204

Id.

205

W.

206

Champ v. McGee, 270 S.E.2d 445, 447 (W. Va. 1980) ("[O]nce a person is convicted of a

Va. CONST. art. III, § 17.

misdemeanor and sentenced to jail, he must post an appeal bond which, if cynically manipulated,
can defeat his appeal.").
207
Statutory tax provisions which deny a taxpayer's access to judicial review are unconstitutional. See R. Commun., Inc. v. Sharp, 875 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. 1994); Jensen v. State Tax
Comm'n, 835 P.2d 965 (Utah 1992).
208
Frantz v. Palmer, No. 29178, 2001 WL 1566731, *1 (W. Va. Oct. 29, 2001).
209

S.B. 650, 2001 Leg., 75th Sess. (W. Va. 2001).
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person who enters into an agreement to employ, direct, coordinate or manage
design professionals and contractors who are hired and paid directly by the
owner or the construction manager." Additionally, the business activities of such
a construction manager are defined as "contracting, so long as the project for
which the construction manager provides the services results in a capital improvement."
b.

Senate Bill 447

This recent amendment to the West Virginia Code added section 11-21 12(d), which has the effect of reducing federal adjusted gross income of certain
retirees. 21 According to the section, any person who retires under an employerprovided defined benefit pension plan that terminates and is covered by a guarantor, may subtract annually the difference in the amount of the maximum annual pension benefit the person would have received had the plan not terminated, and the maximum benefit actually received from the guarantor under a
benefit guarantee plan, if the guarantor's maximum benefit guarantee is less
than that enjoyed under the terminated plan. However, the tax commissioner has
the power to adjust the percentage of the reduction to ensure that the revenues of
the state are not reduced by two million dollars or more in any one year, due to
this new subsection.
c.

House Bill 2968

This bill amends West Virginia Code chapter 11, article 6a, entitled Pol2 11
lution Control Facilities Tax Treatment, by creating section 5a of that chapter.
This new section states:
Each wind turbine installed at a wind power project and each
tower upon which the turbine is affixed shall be considered to
be personal property that is a pollution control facility for purposes of this article and all of the value associated with the wind
turbine and tower shall be accorded salvage valuation. All personal property at a wind power project other than a wind turbine
and tower shall be valued without regard to this article.
This appears to be an attempt by the legislature to favor clean fuel technology by granting preferential treatment under the tax laws to wind turbines.
The legislature furthers this policy in favor of cleaner fuel by also modifying
West Virginia Code section 11-13-2o(c)(2) in this bill to make the taxable generating capacity of a wind turbine unit five percent of the official capacity of the
210

S.B. 447, 2001 Leg., 75th Sess. (W. Va.2001).

211

H.B. 2968, 2001 Leg., 75th Sess. (W. Va. 2001).
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unit, opposed to the forty percent of the generating capacity of all other new
non-peaking plants. 2 12 One can only hope that this modification of the tax laws
is an indication of future legislation favoring clean fuel technology.
d.

Senate Bill 405

This bill amends West Virginia Code section 11-21-9 by adding two
new definitions to the terms section of article twenty-one related to the West
Virginia personal income tax. 2 13 First, the Legislature limited the definition of
"medical savings accounts" so as not to include medical savings accounts established under West Virginia Code section 33-15-20 or -16-15 within the meaning
of "taxable trust. ' 2 14 Furthermore, employer contributions to medical savings
accounts created under said sections are not "wages" for purposes of withholding under § 11-21-71.215
Secondly, the Legislature clarified the meaning of the term "surtax" to
mean:
the 20 percent additional tax imposed on taxable withdrawals
from a medical savings account under... [§ 33-15-20] and the
20 percent additional tax imposed on taxable withdrawals from
a medical savings account under . . . [§ 33-16-15] which are
by the tax commissioner as tax collected under this arcollected
2 16
ticle."
Additionally, the Legislature expressly adopted, with respect to any
term used in this article, the same meaning as that term has under the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 or any other provisions of the laws of the United States
that relate to the determination of income for federal income tax purposes.217
This statement applies to all amendments made to the federal laws referenced
previously, provided they were made after December 31, 1999 but before January 1, 2001. 2 8 The amendments enacted under this bill are retroactive to the
extent allowed under federal income tax law. 2 19 Furthermore, "[w]ith respect to
taxable years that began prior to the first day of January, two thousand, the law
212

Id.

213

S.B. 405, 2001 Leg., 75th Sess. (W. Va. 2001)

214

See W. VA. CODE § 11-21-9(b) (2001).

215

Id.

216

Id. § 11-21-9(c).

217

Id. § 11-21-9(a).

218

Id.

219

Id. § 11-21-9(d).
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in effect for each of those2 jears shall be fully preserved as to that year, except as
provided in this section." 0
E.

General Statutory Changes
1.

House Bill 2482

This bill modifies West Virginia Code section 44-5-12 in two ways.221
Subsection (a) is amended to establish guidelines for disbursement of funds
when 1) the funds are inadequate to fund the bequest or trust completely and 2)
the funds have not been "irrevocably set aside within fifteen months." If either
of these two situations occurs, the fiduciary "shall allocate to the bequest or trust
222
a prorata share of the income earned" on the sum available to the fiduciary.
Prior to this amendment, fiduciaries had no clear mandate from the legislature as
to their responsibilities when the trust or bequest could not be executed because
of insufficient funds.
Furthermore, subsection (d) is added to this section of the code. Subsection (d) grants the fiduciary of any trust discretion to "divide the trust ...for
purposes of the generation skipping transfer tax... or any other tax" without
court approval.
This section appears to have been added to alleviate the court
system of the many requests for approval to divide a trust for tax purposes.
2.

Senate Bill 732

This bill made a few changes to the West Virginia Code. 224 First, the
report of the state's debt is also to be given to the members of the joint committee on government and finance in addition to the governor, president of the Senate, and speaker of the House. Second, this bill modifies article 9, section 109
of the Uniform Commercial Code. As amended, West Virginia Code section
46-9-109(c) no longer applies to the extent that it is superceded by the federal
government, or: "The rights of a transferee beneficiary or nominated person
under a letter of credit are independent and superior under § 5-114. "22 5 Article
9 was also modified to be inapplicable to transfers by a government or government unit.22 6 The next notable modification to article 9 is in §§ 406(i) and
220

Id.

221

H.B. 2482, 2001 Leg., 75th Sess. (W. Va. 2001).

222

Id.

223

Id.

224

S.B. 732, Leg., 75th Sess. (W. Va. 2001).

225

Id.

226

Id.
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408(f). These modifications prevent assignments of "viatical
settlements,"
"workers compensation settlements" and "special needs trust." 227
3.

Senate Bill 418

A recent West Virginia Senate Bill 228 amended some of the statutes associated with regulation of residential mortgage lenders, brokers and servers.
Sections one, two, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, twelve and fourteen, of article seventeen, chapter thirty-one of the West Virginia Code are the affected
statutes. These amendments took effect July 1, 2001.
Part one of section one was amended to require that a loan be a "consumer" loan, and that the property in question must be owner occupied to meet
the definition of "primary mortgage loan., 229 Part two's definition of "subordinate mortgage loan" was amended to also refer to a "consumer" loan and require
owner occupancy. Part 4 includes persons who service mortgage loans in the
regular course of business to be a "lender." 230 Part 5 was changed to include
within the definition of "broker" someone who originates, processes or assigns a
primary or subordinate mortgage loan between a lender and a borrower in the
regular course of business for a fee, commission or other consideration. 23' The
amendment also changed the number of loans in a year triggering the presumption that a person is acting in the regular course of business from five years to
one. Part 13 and 14 were added to provide definitions for "affiliated and "servicing," respectively.2 32
Section two part B was amended to remove from the application of the
article loans made by any lender licensed by, and under the regular supervision
and examination for consumer compliance, of any agency of the federal government.233 The former law had no "regular" or "examination for consumer

compliance" provisions. Part B was also changed to remove from the application of the article loans made by counties or municipal governments, and to exclude loans by non-profit community development organizations only if they are
to promote home ownership or improvements for the disadvantaged. Finally,
part B was changed to exclude loans made by Habitat for Humanity International, Inc. and its affiliates providing low-income housing within the state from
the operation of the statute.
227

S.B. 732, Leg., 75th Sess. (W. Va. 2001) (purpose statement).

228

S.B. 418, Leg., 75th Sess. (W. Va. 2001).

229

W. VA. CODE 31-17-1 (2002).

230

Id.

231

Id.

232

Id.

233

Id. § 31-17-2.
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Section four was amended to provide that licensee bonds are for the
benefit of consumers, to require applicants to pay the cost of fingerprint processing and to change the net asset requirement of lender's license applicants to a
net worth requirement.234 Additionally, applicant brokers who wish to participate in a table-funded residential mortgage loan must file a bond with the commissioner in the amount of $50,000 as opposed to the normal $25,000. Lastly,
applicant brokers must pay a license fee of $350 dollars, up from the previous
$150.235

Section five was amended to change the net asset requirement to a net
worth requirement, and to give the commissioner discretion to consider the experience and general fitness of an applicant. Each application for a lender's or
broker's license must now be passed or refused within ninety days, up from the
previous forty-five. Finally, the provision which, upon denial of an application,
permitted the commissioner to retain the investigation fee but return the license
fee has been changed. Now the commissioner may retain all fees which recover
the administrative costs of processing the application, regardless of origin.236
Section six was amended to change the net asset requirement to a net
worth requirement. Also, foreign corporations no longer must, at all times after
licensing, remain qualified to hold property in the state. Finally, a foreign corporation no longer must remain qualified to transact business in the state if it is
otherwise exempt. 237
Section seven was amended to provide a requirement that renewal applications, beginning in the year 2002, be conditioned upon the attainment of
seven

hou..s of cont-Uing education for eacrh lonn noriinntnr emnlnved

hy

a

licensed broker.238
Section eight was amended to provide that in refinancing a loan, a licensee may not impose the same charges made under the original loan, unless the
new loan has a reasonable, tangible net benefit to the borrower in light of all the
circumstances. The provision which formerly allowed new charges for a refinanced loan if the charges for the old loan had been rebated or credited to the
consumer has been deleted. The definition for "affiliated" is now found in section one. A new provision requires that a borrower must be given a copy of
every signed document executed by the borrower at the time of the closing.
Licensee's may not require the borrower to pay certain charges in excess of six
percent of the amount financed, up from the previous five percent maximum.

234

Id. § 31-17-4.

235

Id.

236

Id. § 31-17-5.

237

Id. § 31-17-6.

238

Id. § 31-17-7.
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Lastly, the amendment has a provision which states that if no yield spread premium is charged, then the aggregate charges may not exceed five percent. 39
Section nine was amended to provide that a HUD 1 or HUD 1A settlement statement that provides the disclosures required by the subsection and all
of the federal law disclosures is considered to meet the requirements of the subsection. Additionally, a new provision requires licensees to keep and maintain
its records regarding residential mortgage loans for thirty-six months after the
date of final entry. 24°
Section twelve was amended to provide the commissioner with the authority to impose a penalty not exceeding one thousand dollars upon any person
who he determines has violated the provisions of the chapter. 24'
Section fourteen was amended to provide a requirement that if the
commissioner appoints a hearing examiner then the commissioner must issue his
final order within fifteen days of receiving the examiner's recommended decision.242
4.

Senate Bill 69

This bill represents the creation of a new statutory lien related to selfservice storage rental transactions. 24 3 This new statute is codified as West Virginia Code § 38-14-1 et seq., and may be referred to as the "Self-Service Storage Lien Act." 244 The provisions of the Self-Service Storage Lien Act (the
"Act") are effective as of and apply to all rental agreements entered into, extended or renewed after July 1, 2001.245 The lien created by the Act grants to
the owner2 4 6 a self-service storage lien ("Lien") on all personal property "stored
within such leased space for agreed rent, labor, or other charges and for expenses reasonably incurred in its sale or destruction."' 24 7 The Act provides that
the Lien attaches on the date that the personal property is first stored in the

239

Id. § 31-17-9.

240

Id.§ 31-17-12.

241

Id. § 31-17-14.

242

31-17-1 (2002).

243

S.B. 69, 2001 Leg., 75th Sess. (W. Va. 2001).

244

W.VA CODE § 38-14-1 (2001).

245

Id. § 38-14-9.

246

Id. § 38-14-2(5) (defined as the "owner, operator, lessor or sublessor of a self-service stor-

age facility or the person's agent or any other person authorized to manage the facility or to receive rent from any occupant under a rental agreement"). This section also distinguishes between
an owner who can avail herself of the provisions of this article and a warehouseman, as used in
W.VA CODE § 46-1l-1 et seq.
247

Id. § 38-14-3(a).
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rented space and continues until the occupant satisfies all terms of the rental
agreement. 248
The Act provides for liens on personal property, including motor vehicles and watercraft. 249 In addition, certain mandatory requirements are set for
the rental agreement itself, and presumably, if the rental agreement does not
250
satisfy these requirements, the lien claimed by the owner can be challenged.
The Act provides for the charging of late fees which also would be secured by
the Lien.
Section five of the Act provides for enforcement of the Lien and is the
heart of the Act. If the occupant is in default under the rental agreement, the
owner must notify the occupant of the default, in a form that satisfies 252 the
253
Act.
If the occupant does not cure 254 the default within sixty days, the owner
may proceed to enforce the Lien by selling the contents of the occupant's unit at
public auction. Alternatively, the owner may destroy the personal property
therein if it can be established that the value of the personal property is insufficient to cover the reasonable costs of conducting a public auction plus the
255
amount of the Lien.
In the case of personal property having a fair market value greater than
$1,000 and against which a secured party has properly filed a financing statement in the name of the occupant, the owner must notify the lienholder of record
by certified mail of the time and place of the public auction not less than thirty
days prior to the auction. 256 At any time prior to the public auction, the lienholder may pay "the reasonable fees and costs due to the person possessing the
self-service storage lien and take possession of the personal property which is
2 57
subject to the lien."
The Act requires the notice of default to include an itemized statement
of the owner's claim, a demand for payment and a conspicuous statement that
Id. § 38-14-2(4) (defining occupant as "a person entitled to the use of a leased space at a
self-service storage facility under a rental agreement, or the person's sublessee, successor or assign").
248

249

Id. § 38-14-3.

250

Id. § 38-14-3(c).

251

Id. § 38-14-4.

252

Id. § 38-14-5(c).

253

Id. § 38-15-5(a).

254

Id. § 38-14-5(d) (by paying the full amount necessary to satisfy the Lien ant any point prior

to the public auction or destruction of the personal property).
255
Id. § 38-14-5(a)(1).
Id. § 38-14-5(a)(2) (or if the personal property is a motor vehicle or watercraft and a lien is
listed on the certificate of title).

256

257

Id.
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unless the claim is paid prior to the enforcement of the Lien, the owner may
either sell the occupant's personal property at public auction or destroy it.
All notices required under the Act are deemed delivered when deposited with
the United States postal service, postage paid. 9 In addition, if the rental
agreement so provides, an owner may, without judicial process, deny the occupant access to its personal property, presumably by changing the lock, so long as
the owner displays a conspicuous sign on the premises stating the name, street
address and telephone number of the owner or
owner's agent who the occupant
260
may contact to redeem her personal property.
If the owner proceeds to enforce the Lien by holding a public auction, it
must advertise the date, time and location of the public auction, the date, time
and location where the property may be inspected and the form of payment acceptable. 26 1 If the owner proceeds in accordance with the provisions of the Act,
the Act provides for limited liability of the owner. 262 Any remaining surplus
obtained from the sale of personal property at public auction, after the owner
satisfies the Lien therefrom, shall be held for delivery on demand of the occupant.2 63
Prior to a sale at public auction or destruction of the occupant's personal
property, the owner must make a detailed inventory list of the personal property
to be sold or destroyed and must maintain the inventory listing for264
a period of
two years after the sale or destruction for review by the occupant.
A bone
fide purchaser for value takes property purchased free from
any
claim
of
occu26 5
pant or any other person against whom the Lien was valid.
5.

House Bill 2738

This bill makes two minor adjustments to the West Virginia Code in or2 66
der to update the code to reflect the adoption of the limited liability company.
First, it adds section 3lb-1-113. This new section requires a limited liability
company that seeks or holds a class A liquor license to disclose in any required
application the identities of all members or persons entitled to "a transfer of
258

Id. § 38-14-5(c).

259

Id. § 38-14-5(h).

260

Id. § 38-14-5(b).

261

Id. § 38-14-5(f).

262

Id. § 38-14-5(e).

263

Id.

264

Id. § 38-14-7.

265

Id. § 38-14-5(g).

266

H.B. 2378, 2001 Leg., 75th Sess. (W. Va. 2001).
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money, property, or other benefit from [the] limited liability company."267 Second, this bill adds limited liability company and professional limited liability
company to the definition of person in both section 47-9-1 and section 47b-1-1.
It appears as though the legislature was updating the statutes to reflect the recent
recognition of the limited liability company and professional limited liability
company in the West Virginia Code.
6.

Senate Bill 226

The Uniform Athlete Agents Act does three things in an effort to protect
student athletes from the pressures of leaving college (or skipping college altogether) to enter professional sports arena. 268 First, it requires "athlete agents" to
register with the secretary of state. 269 The Act defines "athlete agent" as "an
individual who enters into an agency contract with a student-athlete or... recruits or solicits a student-athlete to enter into an agency contract. ' 2 7° A "student-athlete" is "an individual who engages in, is eligible to engage in, or may
be eligible to engage in, any intercollegiate sport. ,,271 Consequently, a lawyer,
registered with the state bar association, cannot act as an athlete agent in the
state of West Virginia until he or she has also registered with the state as an
"athlete agent."
Second, the Act regulates the conduct of the athlete agent. 272 Violations
273
of this Act carries the possibility of both criminal penalties and civil liability.
The criminal punishment varies from misdemeanor to a felony. 274 However, it
is the civil penalties that should concern athlete agents and student athletes. The
Act provides educational institutions that have incurred sanctions as a result of a
violation of the Act "against an athlete agent or a former student athlete for
damages caused by [the] violation ."275 Possible damages to the school that
result after a violation of this Act "include losses and expenses incurred because
...the educational institution was... disqualified or suspended from participation in athletics by a national association for the promotion and regulation of
athletics, by an athletic conference, or by reasonable self-imposed disciplinary
267

W. VA. CODE § 31b-1-101(2001).

268

S.B. 226, 2001 Leg., 75th Sess. (W. Va.2001).

269

W. VA. CODE § 30-38-1 (2001).

270

Id. § 30-38-2(2).

271

Id. § 30-38-2(14).

272

See id. § 30-38-14.

273

See id. §§ 30-38-15 to -16.

274

See id. § 30-38-15.

275

Id. § 30-38-16(a) (emphasis added).
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action taken to mitigate sanctions likely to be imposed by such."' 276 Thus, damages could be extremely high if West Virginia University were to lose its eligibility to compete in championship games because an athlete agent and/or student athlete violated the Act.
Finally, the Act regulates the content of the contract between the student
athlete and the athlete agent.277 Aside from description of the services to be
provided and the rate of compensation, the contract is required to have a conspicuous statement that warns the student athlete of the potential problems of
signing the contract as related to the student's eligibility to compete as a student
athlete. 2 78 The student is also granted a 14 day period after signing the contract
in which he or she may cancel it without being required "to return any consideration received
from the athlete agent to induce the student-athlete to enter into
279
contract."
the
F.

Conclusion

In summary, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals and the West
Virginia Legislature made several minor modifications to the commercial law
area. The Supreme Court's decisions varied from corporate organization to the
definition of "liens" under the West Virginia Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act,
to several cases interpreting the state's tax code. The legislative acts in regards
to taxation in 2001 included the usual attempt by the legislature to broaden the
tax base, but also included a tax break for plants that employ wind power. The
legislature also enacted the Self-Service Storage Lien Act and the Uniform Athlete Agents Act.
G. Kurt Dettinger
Paul L Frampton
Paul W. Gwaltney, Jr.
III. DOMESTIC RELATIONS
A.

Introduction

In 2001, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals and the West
Virginia Legislature made numerous changes that impact families in West Virginia. These statutory enactments and opinions dealt with the rights and responsibilities of both custodial and non-custodial parents. The court also focused on
276

Id. § 30-38-16(b).

277

Id. § 30-38-10.

278

See id.

279

Id.
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visitation and custody rights of grandparents. The legislature enacted a statute
establishing children's centers for the monitoring of custodial responsibilities.
This digest article summarized recent family law cases and legislative enactments in the areas affecting family law in West Virginia.
B.

Divorce Generally
1.

Boarman v. Boarman

Boarman v. Boarman28 concerned an appeal of an order in a divorce
proceeding. The order required Mr. Boarman to either pay a judgment held by
his wife's attorney or face incarceration for contempt. Mrs. Boarman was
awarded $8,766.60 in attorney fees in the divorce proceedings and she assigned
the judgment to her attorney.
Mr. Boarman and the attorney could not reach
an agreement on the judgment and the attorney moved to hold Mr. Boarman in
contempt. 282 The judge granted the order but Mr. Boarman appealed before he
could be arrested, and the judge suspended the order until the appeal was de283
cided.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals began by noting that2 84it
reviews the lower court's decision in these cases with a three-prong standard.
The court reviews the contempt order under an abuse of discretion standard, the
facts under a clearly erroneous standard, and the questions of law under a de
novo standard 285 Under this standard of review, the court held that a judgment
for attorney fees is assignable,
but that "relief by way of contempt is not assign' 286
party."
third
private
a
to
able
In this case, it was conceded by the parties that a valid judgment is assignable to a third person. 2 87 However, Mr. Boarman contended that the judgment was not valid because it was made in a 1994 court order and there had
been a subsequent 1997 final order where she agreed to pay all her own legal
fees.2 88 The court deferred to the findings of the trial court that the 1997 order

280

556 S.E.2d 800 (W. Va.2001).

281

Id. at 802.

282
283

Id.
Id.

284

Id. at 803 (citing Carter v. Carter, 470 S.E.2d 193 (W. Va. 1996)).

285

Boarman, 556 S.E.2d at 803.

286

Id. at 803-04.

287

Id. at 804.
Id. at 804-06.

288
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did not supersede or modify the 1994 order.2 89 Therefore, Mrs. Boarman held a
after the assignment the
valid judgment when she assigned it to her attorney, and
290
attorney held a valid judgment against Mr. Boarman.
Turning to the issue of contempt proceedings against Mr. Boarman, Mr.
the
were assignable to..a third party,
Boarman argued that even if the judgment
29 1
.
292
position.
this
with
agreed
court
The
not.
was
right to hold him in contempt
There are two types of contempt in a domestic case - criminal contempt and
civil contempt. 293 The use of contempt is warranted when a party refuses to
pay alimony or support obligations because the law places a heightened imporhowever, to imprison
tance on these payments. 294 It would be unconstitutional,
295
debt.
ordinary
an
of
non-payment
the
for
someone
Through assignment, the court felt that the judgment had lost its special
position and that the court's authority could no longer be used to vindicate the
wrongs against Mrs. Boarman through a contempt action. 296 Therefore, while
Mrs. Boarman's judgment was valid and her assignment to her attorney was
valid, the attorney's remedies against Mr. Boarman to collect on the judgment
money on a debt. 2 97 Thus, the trial court's
collect
are limited to civil actions to 29
8
contempt order was reversed.
2.

Snider v. Snider

In Snider v. Snider,299 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals expanded the application of the divisible divorce doctrine. The original doctrine
was adopted in 2000 in Burnett v. Burnett.30 0 The Burnett court ruled that the
rights of a West Virginia citizen to seek child and spousal support from a West
Virginia court "is not superceded by a subsequent divorce decree obtained by a

289

Id.

290

Boarman,556 S.E.2d at 805-06.

291

Id.

292

Id.

293

W. VA. CODE § 48-2-22 (2000).

294

Boarman, 555 S.E.2d at 805-06 (citing Smith v. Smith, 95 S.E. 199, 201 (W. Va. 1918)).

295

See id.

296

Id. at 806.

297

Id.

298

Id.

299

551 S.E.2d 693 (W. Va. 2001).

300 344 U.S. 541, 449 (1948).
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foreign state 30where
the foreign state did not have personam jurisdiction over
1
both parties."
The issue before the court in Snider was somewhat different. This time,
the court was asked to address the validity of a preceding divorce decree obtained ex parte in a foreign state, and its effect upon the jurisdiction of a West
Virginia court seeking to adjudicate the property rights and obligations of the
parties to a marriage.
In addressing the various jurisdictional questions, the
appellate court relied heavily on the United State Supreme Court decision in
Estin v. Estin.30 3 In Estin, the Supreme Court determined that allowing one state
to grant a ex parte divorce of the marriage, and another state with jurisdiction
over both parties to address the property rights and obligations of the parties, the
interests of both states are3 accommodated,
"restricting each State to the matters
4
of her dominant concern." 0
Mr. Snider argued that he had insufficient minimum contacts with the
State of West Virginia, and therefore a West Virginia court could not constitutionally assert personal jurisdiction over him. 30 5 However, the court rejected
this argument by noting that West Virginia courts have jurisdiction over domestic relations actions when at least "one of the parties ...at the time the cause of
action arose" has been "an actual bona fide resident of this state and has continued so to be for at least one year next preceding the commencement of the action.,,306
In addition, the court concluded that personal jurisdiction over a non'rvino
the defendant with reasonk nhtn
bt ined upon

resident
;,.1
defendant

able notice of the suit, provided there is sufficient minimum contacts between
the defendant and the forum state. 30 7 'To what extent a nonresident defendant
has minimum contacts with the forum state depends upon the facts of the individual case." ' 30 8 Upon review of the facts, the court found that Mr. Snider had
sufficient minimum contacts with the State of West Virginia. The court specifically found that Mr. Snider had purposefully acted to obtain benefits from the
state. In fact, the marital home was located in West
Virginia and he obtained
3 9
financing for the home from a West Virginia bank. 0
301

Snider, 551 S.E.2d at 697.

302

Id. at 698 (emphasis in original).

303

Id.

304

Id. at 699.

305

Id.

306

Snider,551 S.E.2d at 699.

307

Id.

308 Id.
309

Id.
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Mr. Snider also argued that under West Virginia Code section 48-2-15,
West Virginia courts are only empowered to grant relief "upon ordering a divorce." 3 1° He stressed that because he obtained a divorce in a foreign jurisdiction, West Virginia courts had no authority to address unresolved domestic issues. The court, however, found that such a construction of this statute would
result in an absurdity because it would force West Virginia domiciliaries to
submit to the personal jurisdiction of a foreign state to resolve their personal and
3 11
property rights, or forever waive those rights.
With this broad adoption of the divisible divorce doctrine, the court held
that where a foreign jurisdiction does not have personal jurisdiction over both
parties to a marriage, the personal and property rights of the parties may be litigated in West Virginia separately from a divorce decree issued in another jurisdiction, and issues of spousal support and marital property survive the ex parte
3 12
divorce decree.
C.

Custody Rights & ParentalDeterminations
1.

State ex rel. Denise L.B. v. Burnside

In State ex rel. Denise L.B. v. Burnside,3 13 the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals had to determine whether a relative of a parent had established
standing to intervene in a custody dispute. In this case, Denise and Mark B.
were married in 1990. 314 After a severe accident in July 1999, Mark B. had
significant cognitive and physical limitations and moved in with his mother who
lived in Martinsburg, West Virginia. Denise moved with the couple's two children to Morgantown, West Virginia, where she resided with her mother. Denise
filed a complaint for divorce in the Circuit Court of Raleigh County. A guardian ad litem was appointed to represent the interests of the children during the
315
divorce proceedings.
After the accident, Denise prevented the children from seeing their father and told them he was dead. In February 2, 2001, a telephone hearing was
conducted by the family law master. A third party, Sherry L, the sister of Mark,
took part and presented an emergency motion to intervene in the divorce action
and a motion to take custody of the two children. No evidence was presented
about Sherry L.'s standing to intervene. Evidence was proffered on the question
310

Snider, 551 S.E.2d at 699-701.

311

Id.

312

Id.

313

547 S.E.2d 251 (W. Va. 2001).

314

Id. at 253.

315

Id.
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that she had reservations about the
of custody. The guardian ad litem expressed
316
custody.
Denise's
in
remaining
children
Essentially, the children were left with Denise's mother while Denise
lived and worked in Virginia. The guardian ad litem also testified that the families had become polarized which would harm the children. The family law master forwarded a recommended order to the circuit court recommending that
Sherry L.'s petition to intervene be granted upon findings that she was a fit and
that custody be given to
proper person to have custody. She also recommended
3 17
Denise.
to
given
rights
Sherry L. with visitation
Mark was denied visitation rights until the children received psychological counseling. 3 18 The family law master also recommended a full evidentiary hearing concerning the custody issue be held within twenty days. The circuit court entered an order adopting the family law master's suggestions on Febfiled a petition for a writ of prohibition to halt the enruary 2, 2001. Denise3 19
order.
the
of
forcement
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals had to determine whether
the writ of prohibition was appropriate and whether Sherry L. established standing to intervene. The court held that prohibition was appropriate. It determined
that Sherry L.'s attempt to intervene pursuant to West Virginia Code section 4811-103(2) in order to obtain an ex parte temporary order under West Virginia
as a matter of law because she
Code section 48-2-13(e) was clearly erroneous
320
intervene.
to
standing
did not establish
The court stated that it will consider five factors when determining
whether it is appropriate to issue a writ of prohibition when it is alleged thai tihe
lower court exceeded its legitimate powers. Those five factors are
(1) whether the party seeking the writ has no other adequate
means, such as direct appeal, to obtain the desired relief; (2)
whether the petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way
that is not correctable on appeal; (3) whether the lower tribunal's order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law; (4) whether
the lower tribunal's order is an oft repeated error or manifests
persistent disregard for either procedural or substantive law; and
and important
new
(5) whether the lower tribunal's order raises 32
1
impression.
first
of
law
of
problems or issues
316

Id. at 253-254.

317

Id. at 254.

318

Id.

319

Id. at 254-55.

320

Id. at 255-56.

321

Id. at 255.
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All five32factors
do not need to be satisfied but the third is given substantial
2
weight.
Concerning the third factor, the court found a clear error of law because
Sherry L. tried to intervene under Article 2 of Chapter 48 of the West Virginia
Code .323 The court held that intervention of this type was not authorized by the
Legislature. Sherry L. also argued her intervention was authorized by West
Virginia Code section 48-11-103(2). 324 However, the court held that this section of the Code only applies to interventions under Article 11. 325 Consequently, because Sherry L. sought her exparte temporary order under Article 2
of Chapter 48 and not under Chapter 11326 the court held that Sherry L. lacked
standing and granted
the writ of prohibition to halt the enforcement of the circuit
32 7
court's order.

2.

Frankelv. Frankel

In Frankel v. Frankel,3 28 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
had to determine whether Andrew Frankel was entitled to sole custody of his
two children. In this case, Nancy and Andrew Frankel were divorced in Texas
in 1992. 329 Nancy moved to Huntington, WV with the couple's two children
and had primary custody. Mr. Frankel tried to modify custody in Texas, and
Ms. Frankel sought sole custody of the children in West Virginia. It was decided that West Virginia was considered the home state and the proper forum
for the dispute. While on a visit to their father, the children were enrolled in a
private school and kept in Texas by their father. Mr. Frankel returned the children to West Virginia and filed a custody petition in Cabell County, West Virginia. In August 1999, a custody hearing was held before the family law master.
The focus of the hearing was on the education of the children given their learning disabilities. William, the son, had more severe learning problems than his
330
sister.
The family law master decided that William would be unable to acquire
the appropriate language skills in the West Virginia school system. Therefore,

323

Id. (citing State ex rel. Hoover v. Berger, 199 W. Va. 12, 483 S.E.2d 12 (1996), Syl. Pt. 4.).
W. VA. CODE § 48-2-13(e)(1)(B) (1993).

324

Burnside, 547 S.E.2d at 256.

325

Id.

326

Id.

327

Id.

328

550 S.E.2d 377 (W. Va. 2001).

329

Id. at 378-79.

330

Id.

322
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he recommended that Mr. Frankel be given custody of William so he could attend the Texas private school. 33 1 The daughter was to remain in West Virginia
under the care of Ms. Frankel. The Circuit Court of Cabell County adopted the
family law master's recommendations and entered an order on December 10,
1999. 3 32 Ms. Frankel appealed arguing that the circuit court abused its discretion by adopting the family law master's recommendations and ordering that
William be placed in his father's custody.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals found that the circuit
court had not abused its discretion. 333 The court reiterated the three-pronged
standard of review for reviewing challenges to findings made by a family law
master and subsequently adopted by a circuit court. "A final equitable distribution order is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard; the underlying factual findings are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard; and questions of
law and statutory interpretations are subject to de novo review." 334 After considering the record, the court noted William's severe learning disabilities and decided it was in William's best interests to be placed in his father's custody so he
could attend a private school in Texas. It also noted that a specialized school
near Cabell County did not offer the type of remedial education William needed
due to his learning disabilities. The court said William would only be able to
achieve his "full potential" given specialized education unavailable in the public
facts, the court found that the
Given these
school system of West Virginia.
3 36
decision.
appropriate
the
made
circuit court had
Justice Starcher provided a blistering dissent in which he criticized the
majority for its decision.-3 7 He disagreed with the "full potential" test which
was used by the majority for the first time as a legal test to determine child custody. He found it unbelievable that the West Virginia school system could not
provide sufficient remedial schooling for William's disability. Although he
doubted that the school system suffered from such a deficiency, Justice Starcher
the solution is to fix the school system and "not to ship our chilsuggested that
338
away."
dren

331

Id.

332

Id.

333

Id. at 380.

334

Id. at 379 (citing Burnside v. Burnside, 194 W. Va. 263, 460 S.E.2d 264 (1995), Syl. Pt. 1.).

335

Id.at 380.

336

Id.

337

Id. 380-81.

338

Id. at 381.
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Chief Justice McGraw also dissented stating that he found the majority's conclusion about the West Virginia school system unwarranted. 339 With
Cabell County being the home of Marshall University, he felt sure that sufficient
resources existed to help William overcome his disabilities. He believed the
proper remedy would have been mandating that the board of education provide
William with adequate education. In this case he felt the
majority awarded cus340
tody to the parent with the greater financial resources.
3.

Taylor v. Hoffman

In Taylor v. Hoffman, 34 1 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
had to decide whether the provisions of the paternity determination statute applied in an inheritance dispute. In this case, Christopher Wayne Taylor was
born on June 9, 1970. 34 2 A paternity warrant was issued alleging that Barry
Jordan Hoffman was his biological father. The action was settled with no admission of paternity and an agreement that Hoffman would pay Taylor's mother
a monthly amount to support,
maintain, and educate the child. Taylor turned
34 3
eighteen on June 30, 1988.
Jordan Hoffman died on October 6, 1994.344 His wife was appointed
administratrix of the estate. Taylor filed a civil action against the administratrix
on October 5, 1995. However, the suit was dismissed for failure to serve the
summons and complaint within 180 days. On October 9, 1998, Taylor again
filed a civil action.34 5 It alleged that Taylor was the biological son of the decedent and entitled to a share of the estate. The administratrix filed a motion for
judgment on the pleadings based upon the statute of limitations set out in West
Virginia Code section 48A-6-1(e)(7) which deals with paternity proceedings.
Taylor responded saying that West Virginia Code section 48A-6-2(c) entitled
him to bring the civil action regardless of his current age. The trial court granted
the motion for summary judgment stating that West Virginia Code section 48A6-1(e)(7) required a paternity action to be brought prior to the child's twentyfirst birthday and that West Virginia Code section 48A-6-2(c) did not provide an
exception. 346 Taylor appealed.
339

Id.

340

Id.

341

544 S.E.2d 387 (W.Va. 2001).

342

Id. at 389.

343

Id.

3"

Id.

345

Id.

346

Id. at 389-90.
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Consequently, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals had to determine whether an action was permitted by the explicit and unambiguous language of West Virginia Code section 48A-6-2(c). The court reversed the decision of the lower court stating that West Virginia Code Article 6, Chapter 48A
does not provide a resolution to the inheritance issue. 347 It remanded the case to
the circuit court to analyze on a case-by-case basis. Article 6 of Chapter 48A
deals with paternity issues and enforcing child support. The issue brought before the circuit court was one of inheritance which is governed by a different
portion of the West Virginia Code. Until 1999 the Legislature did not provide a
scheme to outline how illegitimate children could prove entitlement to inherit
from their fathers. Since the case was brought prior to the 1999 amendment of
West Virginia Code section 42-1-5, the Court had to evaluate each action on a
case-by-case basis. Therefore, a prospective heir born out of wedlock trying to
establish a right to inherit before the 1999 amendment can maintain an action
348
without regard to the limitations in West Virginia Code section 48A-6-1.
Limitations in the paternity statute are not applicable to civil actions by children
born out of wedlock seeking34to9 inherit from their fathers brought under West
Virginia Code section 42-1-5.
4.

In re Brian James D.

In In re Brian James D.,350 the Court had to determine whether incarceration mandated a finding of neglect. In this case, Brian L. and Amanda K.
Abuse and neglect proceedings began
are the parents of Brian James Di
against the parents in May 1999 when Amanda K. was put in jail. The petition
asserted that Brian L. had failed to visit or have contact with the child. The allegations were dismissed, and Brian L. was given custody of the child. In
March 2000, another abuse and neglect petition was filed against the parents.
Brian L. had been arrested and charged with delivery of a controlled substance.
and legal custody of the
Brian James D. was placed in the temporary physical
35 2
West Virginia Department of Human Resources.
An adjudicatory hearing was held on May 3, 2000. Brian L. admitted to
selling drugs from his residence while Brian James D. was present. The circuit
court found that Brian L. had abused and neglected his son and granted a motion
allowing Brian L. to obtain a psychological evaluation regarding his fitness as a
parent. The assessment revealed no drug or alcohol problems and no diagnos347

Id. at 394-95.

348

Id. at 395.

349

Id.

350

550 S.E.2d 73 (W. Va. 2001).

351

Id. at 75-76.
Id.

352
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able psychiatric condition. The circuit court terminated Brian L.'s parental
rights. 353 Brian L. did plead guilty to two counts of delivery of a controlled
substance. He was granted home confinement after serving 120 days in jail. He
was also placed on five years of probation. Brian L. appealed the circuit court's
354
decision regarding the termination of his parental rights.
The court had to determine whether the circuit court erred in terminating parental rights based solely on the fact that Brian L. was charged with and
admitted to selling a controlled substance from his residence while his child was
present. The court agreed with the appellant that the circuit court did err in its
decision. It remanded the case back to the circuit court to develop a plan to reunify Brian L. and his child as soon as possible.
The court noted that incarceration, per se, does not warrant the termination of parental rights. It can only be considered along with other factors which
355
impact the ability of the parent to remedy the conditions of abuse and neglect.
The court reviewed the home confinement and probation factors and felt that
these conditions would likely prevent the criminal conduct from happening
again. Given the child's placement in at least six different homes, the court felt
3 56
the father could provide the permanency the son needed in his life.
Justice Maynard dissented in the case. 357 He felt the majority ignored
the best interests of the child. He felt Brian L. did not demonstrate an appreciation of the seriousness of his drug trafficking and would likely engage in drug
activity in the future. Justice Maynard stated that the court had held in prior
cases that the best interests of the child were paramount in abuse and neglect
proceedings. 358 He felt those interests would be best served by terminating the
parental rights and placing Brian James D. in a permanent home. Justice Davis
also joined the dissent.
5.

In re Edward B.

In In re EdwardB.,3 59 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals had
to determine whether the circuit court erred in its disposition of abuse and neglect proceedings because it did not set out proper findings of fact in rendering
36
its decision. In this case, the appellant was the mother of several children. 0
353

Id.

354

Id. at 76.

355
356

Id. (citing In re Emily, 540 S.E.2d 542, 559 (W. Va. 2000)).
Id. at 76-78.

357

Id. at 78-79.

358

Id.

359

558 S.E.2d 620 (2001).

360

Id. at 624-25.
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The Circuit Court of McDowell County terminated her parental rights to an infant son Benny, transferred exclusive legal and physical custody of three other
children to their father, and transferred legal and physical custody of a fifth child
to the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources. The mother
appealed the rulings made arguing that the lower court erred because it failed to
make specific findings of fact required by West Virginia Code sections 49-6custody or terminating rights as a
5(a)(5) and 49-6-5(a)(6) when transferring
36 1
result of a finding of abuse or neglect.
failed to make the statutory findings
The court held that the lower court
•• 362
Given the lower court's disregard
required by the applicable code provisions.
and frustration of the process set out by the Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse
and Neglect Proceedings and related statutes, the court vacated the order of disposition and remanded the case to the lower court for compliance with the process and entry of an appropriate dispositional order. 363 The lower court's failure
to set out required findings of fact and follow the processes mandated by law
jeopardized the comprehensive and fair procedures to be used in abuse and neglect cases. 3 64 Furthermore, the rules and statutes are mandatory requirements
for the courts and not merely to be used as guidance. 365 Finally, the court noted
that procedurally these directives provided the framework for appellate review
of a circuit court's action. When a circuit court ignored or failed to comply366with
the requirements, it unnecessarily frustrated the task of the appellate court.
6.

In re Rrnndnn [Ppe R.

In In re Brandon Lee B., 367 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals had to determine whether the circuit court erred in dismissing a child neglect and abandonment
petition. In this case, Brandon Lee B. was born three
S 368
His mother had been in a series of unsuccessful relationmonths premature.
ships and had warrants pending in Indiana. While Brandon remained in the
hospital, his mother failed to visit him and arranged for her own arrest. The
West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources filed a child neglect
and abandonment petition which was later amended to allege the his mother was
361

Id. at 626-28.

362

Id. at 632-34.

363

Id.

364

/d. at 630-3 1.

365

Id. at 631.

366

Id.

367

In re Brandon Lee B., No. 29701, 2001 W. Va. Lexis at *3-*9 (Dec. 7, 2001).

368

Id.
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unfit to parent Brandon because of his special needs. 369 At an adjudicatory
hearing, DHHR presented evidence regarding the fitness of Brandon's mother.
the circuit court ordered that the child abuse and neglect petition be dismissed
because it held that a finding of neglect and abuse had to be based on conditions
existing at the time the petition was filed. It found that much of the evidence
presented by the DHHR concerning the mother's fitness involved conditions
that arose after the petition was filed; consequently, the DHHR failed to meet its
burden. The DHHR appealed the holding alleging that the circuit court had
erred in its holding and in not granting its petition 37 Therefore, the issue before the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals was whether facts developed
after the filing of a child abuse and neglect petition or amended petition can be
considered in evaluating the conditions
which existed at the time of the filing of
37 1
the petition or amended petition.
The court found that those facts can be considered as held in State v.
Julie G., 3 7 2 Furthermore, the court found that the mother lacked the stability,
maturity, judgment, and discipline necessary to provide care for Brandon and
that the evidence was sufficient to terminate her parental rights. 37 3 It held that
the circuit court erred in concluding that it could only consider the conduct of
the mother at the time of the filing of the petition in determining her fitness to
have custody of her child. 3 74 The Court ordered the judgment of the circuit
court reversed and remanded to the circuit court with directions to terminate the
375
mother's parental rights.
Justice Albright's dissent and concurrence points out the irony of the
court's action in light of its disposition of In re Edward B. 376 In that case, the
court admonished the circuit court for not following the rules and procedures set
out in the West Virginia Code when dealing with the termination of parental
rights. Yet, the court in this case terminated parental rights without allowing the
circuit court to hold a disposition hearing as required by Rules 33 and 35 of the
Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings. Given that the
court had no authority to terminate parental rights without the mandatory pre-

369

Id.

370

Id.

371
372

Id.
201 W. Va. 764 (1997).

373

Brandon Lee, at *12-* 14.

374

Id.

375

Id.

376

Id. at *14-*18.
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requisite of a dispositional
hearing, Justice Albright dissented from that portion
377
of the majority opinion.
7.

State ex rel. Jeanne U. v. Canady

In State ex rel. Jeanne U. v. Canady,378 the court had to determine
whether a father was entitled to visitation rights with respect to his son. In this
case, while Jeanne U. was married to David U., she became pregnant with Stephen M.'s child. 379 She gave birth to Jordan U. on May 27, 1989. Stephen M.
was advised by his attorney that he had no legal standing to pursue an action for
paternity since Jeanne U. was married to another man, but he still made some
visits and paid child support. Jeanne U. and David U. subsequently divorced in
1992. When Stephen M. requested a family law master hearing to determine
paternity, Jeanne U. began to refuse child support payments and visitation.
Stephen M. then pursued legal remedies from 1993 until 1997, finally filing a
declaratory judgment action in lower court to be adjudicated as Jordan's bio38 0
logical father and to establish visitation and support.
The lower court determined from the guardian ad litem's report and
Stephen M.'s testimony that there was a substantial relationship between
Stephen M. and Jordan U. The judge denied Jeanne U.'s request to testify, however, finding her testimony unnecessary. 38 1 The judge's order provided that a
child psychologist would conduct an investigation to determine if disclosure of
who his father is would be harmful to Jordan U. and to come up with a visitation
schedule. Both Jeanne U. and Stephen M. agreed to be bound by the psycholo3 82
gist's recommendations.
The psychologist's report stated that Jordan should be told who his father is. The report further recommended visitation, and recommended that a
psychologist facilitate the visitation. The court ordered that the recommendations of the psychologist were in the best interest of Jordan U., and that they be
implemented. The judge appointed a visitation coordinator, but Jeanne U. still
refused to tell her son who his father was. Jeanne U. then filed for a writ of prohibition to prevent enforcement of the order on the grounds that she was improperly derived of an opportunity to be heard on the issue of the best interests

377

Id. at *15-*18.

378

554 S.E.2d 121 (W. Va. 2001).

379

Id. at 126.

380

Id. at 126-27.

381

Id. at 127.

382

Id.
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of her son. She then informed her son that Stephen M. was his biological father,
38 3
but still wanted to reverse the order granting visitation rights to Stephen M.
The standard of review in this case was a five-factor test taken from
ex
State Rel. Hoover v. Berger:
(1) whether the party seeking the writ has no other adequate
means, such as direct appeal, to obtain the desired relief; (2)
whether the petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way
that is not correctable on appeal; (3) whether the lower tribunal's order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law; (4) whether
the lower tribunal's order is an oft repeated error or manifests
persistent disregard for either procedural or substantive law; and
new and important
(5) whether the lower tribunal's order raises 384
impression.
first
of
law
of
problems or issues
These factors are general guidelines that serve as a useful starting point
for determining whether a discretionary writ of prohibition should issue. Although all five factors need not be satisfied, it is clear that the third factor, the
existence of clear error as a matter of law, should be given substantial weight.38 5
The court distinguished this case from State ex Rel. Roy Allen S. v.
386
Stone, where it found that a biological father must prove by clear and convincing evidence certain factors before he will have standing to raise the issue of
paternity of a child born to a married woman who is not his wife: 1) that he has
developed a parent-child relationship with the child in question and 2) that the
child will not be harmed by allowing the paternity action to proceed. 3 87 Distinction between this case and Roy Allen S. is that Roy did not include a stipulation
that the individual was the child's biological father. In Roy, the issue was standstanding to establish paternity. In this case
ing to raise the issue of paternity, and
388
paternity has already been resolved.
However, "the finding of paternity only entitles the natural father an opportunity to request to invoke his parental rights .... [I]t would remain for the
circuit court to determine issues of visitation, custody, etc., based on the best
interests of the child." 389 Roy further held that "even if he proves paternity, he
383

Id.

394
385

483 S.E.2d 12 (W. Va. 1996).
Id.

386

474 S.E. 2d 554 (W. Va. 1996).

387

State ex. Rel. Jeanne U., 554 S.E.2d at 128 (citing State ex. Rel. Roy Allen S., 474 S.E.2d at

syl pt. 6).
388 Id.
389

Id (quoting State ex. Rel. Roy Allen S., 474 S.E.2d at 566).
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still is not necessarily entitled to intrude further into the marital family (if it has
survived) or into existing child-parent relationships, including any relationship
that has developed between the presumed father and the child .... 390 The
West Supreme Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court was correct in its
determination that evidence of a substantial relationship was not required in this
case because of the stipulation regarding paternity. The court held, however,
that the "substantial relationship" inquiry serves a dual role in evaluating issues
of paternity and appropriate visitation rights - 1) a gatekeeping role in determining a putative father's standing to raise the issue of paternity and must be proven
as a prerequisite to permitting the action by the father, and 2) an issue to be examined with regard to the best interests of the child - with the existence of a
substantial relationship
as one of the many factors to be evaluated, significant
39 1
dispositive."
not
but
The court remanded the case to the trial court for an examination of the
issue of visitation in light of Jordan's best interests, consisting of an evidentiary
hearing including testimony of parties and witnesses and taking into account
Jordan's preferences considering his age, maturity level, and ability to make an
independent judgment. 392 The court further held that Jeanne U. should be allowed to testify in the hearing on the best interests issue, and that while the trial
court should take into account the opinions of the parties, the guardian ad litem,
the psychologist and other experts, the final power of disposition is in the hands
of the trial court to exercise its independent judgment and the court's judicial
child is the polar star y uhich a11 mntterc
power 3 93 "The best interests of the
394
guided."
be
must
affecting children
8.

State ex rel. Brandon v. Moats

In State ex rel. Brandon v. Moats,395 the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals had to decide the constitutionality of West Virginia's grandparent's
visitation statute. In this case, Carol Jo L. and David Allen C., birth parents of
Alexander David, divorced in 1998 and Carol L. was awarded sole care, custody, and control of Alexander. 39 6 David Allen C. was awarded visitation rights.
In accordance with the divorce order, David Allen's visitation rights were exercised under the supervision of Linda K, his mother (the child's paternal grand390

Id.

391

Id. at 127-28.

392

Id. at 129-30.

393

Id.

394

Id. at 130 (quoting In re Brian D., 461 S.E.2d 429 at syl. pt. 7).

395

551 S.E.2d 674 (2001).

396

Id. at 676-77.
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mother). In February 2000, Carol Jo L. remarried and her new husband legally
adopted the child in May of 2000. After the adoption, Carol L. (the mother) sent
Linda K. a letter informing her that she no longer had grandparent's rights and
would no longer visit Alexander. 397 Thereafter, the grandparents filed an action
in circuit court on May 23, 2000 seeking visitation rights.
The petitioners entered a motion to dismiss, based on the theory that the
respondents did not have standing under the Grandparent Visitation Act. The
family law master recommended dismissal on those grounds. Then, the respondents sought review of that recommended disposition before the circuit court.
The Circuit court rejected the family law master's recommendation and recommitted the matter to the family law master for an evidentiary hearing. Here, the
petitioners (the parents) seek a writ of prohibition to prevent the matter from
proceeding to the evidentiary hearing. 399 The court held that the Grandparent
Visitation Act does not violate the substantive due process right of liberty exand
tended to a parent in connection with his/her right to exercise care, custody,
4 00
control of his/her children without undue interference from the state.
The court discussed two main issues in this case-standing and the constitutionality of West Virginia's Grandparent Visitation Act. 40 1 On the issue of
standing, the court held that the paternal grandparents had standing to petition
for visitation under the Act, even though the child had since been legally
adopted by his mother's new husband.40 2 The court explained that the Act gives
grandparents standing even if no other domestic relations action is pending and
also points out that the Act explicitly states that it is the exclusive legislation
regarding the dissoluregarding grandparent's visitation. Therefore, the statutes
40 3
inapplicable.
are
adoptions
in
relationships
legal
of
tion
As to the constitutionality of the Act, the court compared the statute to
the one found unconstitutional in Troxel v. Granville,404 and found that West
Virginia's statute is constitutional on its face because it requires a consideration
of the best interests of the child and the protection of the parent-child relationship from interference. 40 5 The court asserted that West Virginia's Act is much
more narrowly tailored than Washington's and particularly emphasized that
397

Id.

398

Id. at 677.

399

Id.

400

Id.

401

Id. at 677-82.
Id.

402

403

Id.

4W

530 U.S. 57 (2000).

405

Id. at 688-92.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2002

51

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 104, Iss. 3 [2002], Art. 9

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 104

West Virginia's statute lists parental preference as to visitation as a factor for
determining the best interests of the child. The court did not address4 06the asapplied challenge to the Act because of the procedural phase of the case.
Justice Davis submitted a dissent in which she expressed concern about
40 7
the effects the majority opinion would have on adoption law in the state.
Previously, adoptions were considered a complete divestiture of an adoptee's
former familial and legal ties, but this decision allows a legal relationship to
survive an adoption by allowing grandparents to petition for visitation of their
former grandchildren under the Act. Davis was also concerned about the security and finality of adoptions. Additionally, Davis asserted that the opinion
should only be applied prospectively (not retroactively) because it was a departure from prior precedent and applying it retroactively would not provide
enough notice.
9.

State ex rel. Dep't of Health & Human Resources v. Wavey
Glenn G.

In State ex rel. Dep't of Health & Human Resources v. Wavey Glenn
G.,40 8 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed a lower court's
40 9
decision finding that the appellant was the biological father of an infant.
Therefore, the circuit court had erred when it required him to pay child support
and reimburse AFDC for expenditures.
In this case, a civil action was instituted by the DHHR on behalf of
Therece T. against the appellant to establish paternity and child support.4 0
When the appellant failed to file an answer to the complaint, the DHHR moved
for default judgment. The appellant also failed to appear at the family law master hearing. As a result, the law master filed a recommended order establishing
paternity. The appellant filed exceptions to the order and indicated specifically
that he was not the child's father. In addition, he indicated that he had requested
blood testing to determine paternity, but was denied testing by the child's
mother. The circuit court, unaware the appellant's exception, filed a motion for
hearing. The appellant did not appear at this hearing, and the court adopted the
law master's recommendation, establishing paternity and awarding child support. Upon reviewing the case, the court found that West Virginia Code section
48A-6- 1(h) permits default judgment in a paternity action where the defendant
fails to appear "or otherwise defend" the claim against him.4 11 In the instant
406

Id.

407

Id. at 691-92 (Davis, J., dissenting).

408

557 S.E.2d 267 (2001).

409

Id. at 269.

410

Id. at 269-70.

411

Id. at 270-71.
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case, the appellant had filed timely exceptions, even though he failed to appear
at the hearing. Because exceptions had been filed, the court found that the appellant had met the provision of 48A-6-1 and reversed the lower court decision
and remanded the matter for entry of an order requiring4 genetic
testing to deter2
mine whether the appellant is the father the infant child.
10.

Bowman v. Blevins

In Bowman v. Blevins,4 13 the court upheld the decision of a family law
master and circuit court determining that two grandchildren may choose to live
with their grandparents. 4 14 The appellant in this case was a former West Virginia resident and the father of two children both of whom were born in West
Virginia. In 1986, following their mother's death, the children moved to North
Carolina to live with their father. Subsequently, one of 4the
15 children moved back
to West Virginia to live with the maternal grandparents.
This case started when the grandparents filed a child custody action in
circuit court. The petition asserted, inter alia, that both children wanted to reside with the grandparents. After a hearing on the matter, the family law master
issued an order awarding custody of the two children to the appellees. The order was approved by the circuit judge.4 16 The appellant argued that the family
law master did not have jurisdiction because the petition was filed by a nonparent. However, the court, relying on its early decision in Overfield v.
Collins,4 17 rejected this argument.
The Overfield court recognized jurisdiction in a similar type of case,
where a non-parent filed a petition which set forth all of the reasons why the
4 18
change of custody was required, and proper notice and service was obtained.
In addition, the court concluded that an opposing party must be given the right
to present evidence as to the reasons why custody should not be changed, and
obtain a decision from a neutral, detached tribunal. 4 19 The court in the present
case found that420the grandparents had followed the procedure outlined in the
Overfield case.
412

Id. at 271-72.

413

557 S.E.2d 303 (W. Va. 2001).

414

Id. at 304.

415
416

Id. at 304-05.
Id. at 305.

417

Id.

418

Id.

419

Id.

420

Id.
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The appellant also argued that the lower court placed too much weight
on the children's stated preferences. However, the court declined to accept this
argument based on the Court's earlier analysis in Rose v. Rose.4 2 1 In Rose, the
court outlined certain standards to evaluate child preferences. 422 In the present
case, the court found that the children were beyond the age of discretion, and
that the children's preferences were reasonable and that they were not under any
undue influence. In addition, the grandparent's home was a fit place, and the
children had strong ties there. Based on these 423
facts, the court reversed the lower
court and granted custody to the grandparents.
11.

State ex rel. W. Va. v. Pancake

In State ex rel. W. Va. v. Pancake,424 the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals determined that circuit courts have jurisdiction to conduct a hearing
even though a parent has relinquished parental rights, when the parent claims
that the relinquishment was obtained by means of duress and fraud.42 5 The
governing statute, West Virginia Code section 49-6-7, provides that "an agreement of a natural parent in termination of parental rights will be valid if made by
a duly acknowledged writing, and entered into under circumstances free from
duress and fraud. ' 4 26 The court held that such a provision would be meaningless if a trial court could
not conduct a hearing to determine whether such cir42 7
existed.
cumstances
By the facts presented at trial, and by the determination of the circuit
court judge, the court felt that this case presented at least some suspicion that the
father had relinquished his parental rights under duress and fraud. Because issues such as these are clearly questions of fact, the court concluded that the provisions of West Virginia Code section 49-6-7 allow a circuit court to conduct a
hearing to determine whether the signing by a parent of an agreement relin428
quishing parental rights was free from fraud and duress.
The concurring opinion of Justice Davis stressed the prevailing principle of issues regarding relinquishment of parental rights, the so-called polar star
principle in such cases, that being the best interests of the child. 429 She ad421

340 S.E.2d 176 (1986).

422

Id. at 179-80.

423

Blevins, 557 S.E.2d at 30.

424

544 S.E.2d 403 (W. Va. 2001).

425

Id.

426

Id. at 406 (citing W. VA.

427

Id.

428

Id. at 405-06.

429

Id. at 406-07.

at 406.
CODE

§ 49-6-7 (1977)).
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dressed the heavy burden of proof for the parent, and specifically reminded trial
courts30of the importance of this principle before making any final custody deci4
sion.
Child Support & Alimony

D.

1.

State ex rel. Dep't of Health & Human Resources v. Baker

In State ex rel. Dep't of Health & Human Resources v. Baker,431 the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed a lower court's finding that
monies received from the exercise of a stock option were included in the definition of gross income, and therefore are not immune from child support attachment. 43 In the same decision, the court reversed the lower court's ruling with
regard to attribution of income in the case of an employee who was involuntarily terminated.
In Baker, the appellant was adjudicated to be the father of an infant
43
3
During the hearing for child support determination, he indicated that
child.
he had just lost his job, but was in the process of challenging his termination.
The family law master included as "gross income" to earnings that the appellant
had received from the exercise of stock options, and the circuit court adopted the
family law master's recommendation. 434 The appellant challenged both the
inclusion of the stock option earnings and income attribution in calculating the
child support payment.
The court went directly to the relevant and controlling statute to determine the meaning of "gross income." Under West Virginia Code section 48Aincome 4 35
1A-19(a), "gross income" is defined as both "earned and unearned
and also includes earnings from capital gains. 436 The court concluded that none
of the exclusions to capital gains under West Virginia Code section 48A-1A19(d), applied to these earnings. 437 As a result of the strict statutory interpretation, the court concluded that the income from the exercise of stock options
should be used to calculate the child support obligation.
The court, however, also concluded that the attribution of income used
by the circuit court was incorrect because the appellant did not voluntarily ter430

Id.

431

557 S.E.2d 267 (W. Va. 2001).

432

Id. at 269.

433 Id.
434

Id.

435 Id. at 270.
436

Id.

437

Id.
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minate his employment in order to avoid paying child support. 438 According to
West Virginia Code section 48A-IA-3, attribution of income is expressly permitted based on an obligor's prior level of income when the individual voluntarily leaves employment or voluntarily alters his employment so as to be unemployed, underemployed, or employed below full earning capacity. 439 Because
were no facts
the appellant's employment was terminated by the employer, there
44
0
to support the application of attribution of income in this case.
2.

Hickman v. Hickman

In Hickman v. Hickman,44 1 the defendant, Ms. Hickman appealed an
order which modified her divorce decree by reducing monthly child support
payment, terminating alimony, and terminating payment of health insurance
premiums by her former spouse. 442 Ms. Hickman asked that the court reinstate
that the trial court abused its
the divorce decree, and in the alternative, asserted
443
dicretion in imposing the retroactive payment.
After the couple married in 1990, Mr. Hickman adopted Ms. Hickman's
4 44
daughter, who was suffering from a muscle disease called hypotonic diplegia.
After the divorce, alimony payments that were ordered because Ms. Hickman
was unable to work because she had to stay home and care for her daughter.
However, Mr. Hickman filed for a modification of the divorce decree by presenting evidence from the daughter's physician that she no longer needed special care from her mother. The trial court found that Ms. Hickman was not precluded from working and that she had skills to obtain gainful employment.
Also, Mr. Hickman showed that he had a significant reduction in income due to
his retirement. Therefore, the lower court found that a substantial change of
of the divorce
circumstances had occurred that would permit a modification
445
judgment.
court's
trial
the
of
part
that
decree, and affirmed
The court agreed with Mr. Hickman as far as the reduction in child support and alimony. 447However, the court reversed and remanded the issue of the
retroactive payment, because the record was inadequate to determine whether
438

Id. at 270-72.

439

Id.

4

Id. at 272.

441 558 S.E.2d 607 (W. Va. 2001).
442
Id. at 608-09.
443

Id.

444

Id.

445 Id. at 609.

446

Id. at 609-11.
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Ms. Hickman had the ability
to pay such a judgment and if this payment will be
4 47
a financial hardship to her.
3.

Hagerv. Hager

In Hagerv. Hager,44 8 Mr. Grady Hager appealed an order from the Circuit Court of Boone County, which denied a motion made by him under Rule
60(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure to alter the judgment in his
divorce case. When he and Ms. Hager were divorced, she stated that she had
never been previously employed and that she was disabled and incapable of
working. The family law master found that she had no income earning ability
whatsover and recommended that she receive $800 per month in alimony and
that Mr. Hager pay for her health insurance and attorney's fees. After the entry
of the court's judgment, which accepted the family law master's findings, Mr.
Hager learned that Ms. Hager had actually been working and earning money;
therefore, he filed a motion for the court to modify that alimony award. He alleged that Ms. Hager had committed fraud on the family law master and the
court. The circuit
court found that he had not met the burden of proof under
44 9
Rule 60(b).
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals found that by failing to
testify fully and completely, Ms. Hagar acted falsely and committed fraud and
therefore the circuit court should have set aside the alimony award and reconsidered its decision. 45 Therefore, the decision was reversed and remanded.
Justice Davis dissented, pointing to the evidence that Ms. Hager was
disabled and that she had only held a few "odd jobs" for which she received
minimum wage or less. 4 5 1 Moreover, Ms. Hager had been forced to take these
odd jobs out of financial destitution due to her divorce. Davis asserted that Ms.
Hager only briefly engaged in odd jobs and that these jobs do not establish fraud
or that she was able to maintain full-time employment. She also cited Ms.
Hager's age (55) and the fact that she does not have a high school diploma or
any marketable employment skills. Also, as a result of her health problems, she
was unable to work an eight-hour job. Davis claimed that the majority's decision rewarded Mr. Hager for his adultery (the reason for the divorce) by allowing him to maintain the same standard of living while his ex-wife lived in poverty. She called the majority opinion "a retreat to former times when draconian

447

Id.

448

2001 W.Va. LEXIS 145, *15-*16 (Nov. 7, 2001).

449

Id. at *3-*4.

450

Id. at *7-*9.

451

Id. at *10.
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barriers were erected
to prevent women from obtaining alimony simply because
4 52
they were women."
4.

Sinclair v. Sinclair

Sinclair v. Sinclair4 53 is an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court of
Preston County granting a judgment against Mr. Sinclair in the amount of $7,
624.51 to reimburse the State of West Virginia for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) for benefits paid to his wife on behalf of their children. Mr. Sinclair claimed that he was totally disabled and without income during the period in which his wife received the benefits. He also contended that
the lower court erred in entering an order enforcing a judgment that 454
was received in violation of federal regulations and in the absence of a hearing.
In 1989, the appellant and Mrs. Sinclair separated and she applied for
AFDC benefits. She also assigned her right to bring suit against the appellant
for child support payments to the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR). 455 In 1992, a complaint seeking to establish an
amount of child support owed by the appellant was filed through the DHHR.
The complaint requested that Mr. Sinclair be required to reimburse the DHHR
for support paid on the behalf of the children. Mr. Sinclair failed to file an answer to the complaint or to appear. Therefore, a default judgment was entered
against Mr. Sinclair for the benefits. In 1993, a family law master issued findings of fact and conclusions of law, finding that Mr. Sinclair's employment
status was unknown and that the State was entitled to reimbursement of $9,
346.00 for benefits paid to the children. In 1998, Mrs. Sinclair filed for divorce
and no child support was ordered because she and the appellant filed a Joint
Parenting Plan. In 2000, the DHHR filed a motion for decretal
judgment re4 56
questing enforcement of the 1993 AFDC reimbursement order.
The court cited its holding in State ex rel. Deprtment of Human Sevices
v. Huffman that the DHHR may receive only those rights to recoup the benefits
paid under the AFDC that the recipient could assign-the recipient's right to
support and maintenance.4 57 The "right to support and maintenance is dependent on the ability of the responsible relative to pay and the determination of ability to pay must be made through an administrative hearing or court proceed-

452

ld. at *15-*16.

453

557 S.E.2d 761 (W. Va. 2001).

454

Id. at 763-64.

455 Id.
456
Id. at 764.
457

332 S.E.2d 866 (1985).
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ing." 458 In Huffman, the court recognized that it had to follow federal regulations that establish mandatory procedures for the determination of the amount of
reimbursement to which the DHHR would be entitled. 459 The court concluded
that neither the 1993 nor the 2000 judgments were based upon the findings of a
Huffinan hearing, and that the appellant has a right to a hearing to determine his
ability to pay reimbursement.
Therefore, the case was reversed and remanded
460
for a Huffinan hearing.
Justice Davis and Justice Maynard dissented. 46 1 In the dissenting opinion written by Justice Davis, she asserted that Mr. Sinclair waived his right to a
Huffman hearing because he failed to answer the complaint against him in 1992,
and he did not file a petition for review of the recommended decision or appeal
the final order in 1993. Mr. Sinclair only sought appeal for the decision in 2000,
but in his Petition for Review, he did not allege any mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect or unavoidable cause, fraud, misrepresentation, or other
misconduct as required by Rule 60(b). 462 Davis stated that the majority's opinion allowed Mr. Sinclair to "arrogantly refuse to answer a complaint that would
have given him a Huffman hearing" and to "pompously decide when he would
prefer to raise the issue of a Huffman hearing.46 3 "She asserted that because Mr.
Sinclair chose to sleep on his rights for seven years, that he has waived his right
464
for a Huffman hearing.
5.

Steel v. Hartwick

In Steel v. Hartwick,4 65 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
had to determine whether a father was entitled to reimbursement for overpayment of child support. In this case, appellant and appellee were divorced in
1991. Appellant was ordered to pay appellee $135 per week for each of their
two children in child support. 466 In 1995, the appellant was severely injured at
work and was unable to work. He continued to make child support payments
throughout this time. In 1997, appellant petitioned the court for a reduction in
his child support payments. Soon after filing this petition, the appellant was
458

Id. at 402.

459

Id. at 765.

460

Id.

461 Id. at 767.
462

Id.

463

Id.

464

Id.

465 551 S.E.2d 42 (W.Va. 2001).
46M Id. at 43-44.
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notified that he had been adjudicated as disabled under the Social Security Act
and was entitled to retroactive disability benefits from the time of his injury in
1995. As a part of the award, his ex-wife also received retroactive Social Security benefits for the dependent children in the amount of $6, 709 for each child.
The appellant petitioned the circuit court to require the appellee to reimburse
him for the child support payments he had made in the period from July 1995 to
August 1997, claiming that she had been paid twice and in effect, had been unjustly enriched.4 6 7
The circuit court reduced his child support payments, but refused to order appellee to reimburse the appellant for child support payments. 468 The appellant sought review of this decision of the circuit court. Upon review, the
court concluded that the children had a legal right to receive the child support
and the social security benefits and the found no legal basis for depriving them
of their property. 469 The court cited the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 407),
which states that a person's right to receive benefits is not transferable and that
any money paid under the Act is not subject to legal process. 47 Also, the court
stated that the United States Supreme Court had interpreted this statute to mean
47 1
that the use of any legal process to reach social security benefits is barred.
Therefore, if it were to require a reimbursement,
it would have to be from a fund
47 2
other than those awarded by Social Security.
The court also found that child support payments are made for the benefit of children and that these payments are the children's entitlement and propertv

Also, the court asarted that the ocial security benefits were also made for

the benefit of the children and are considered the children's property. Accordingly, the court held that since the children had a legal right to these benefits,
they were not unjustly enriched and that it would be inequitable
to require ap473
payments.
support
child
the
for
appellant
the
reimburse
to
pellee
6.

State ex. rel Dep't of Health & Human Resources v. Wertman

State ex. rel Dep't of Health and Human Resources v. Wertman4 74 involves two certified questions from the Circuit Court of Berkeley County. The
first question was whether West Virginia Code section 51-2A-1 allows "family
467 Id. at 44.
468
Id.
469

Id. at 45.

470

Id.

471 Id. (citing Philpott v. Escex City, 409 U.S. 413 (1973)).
472

Id.

473

Id. at 45-46.

474 557 S.E.2d 773 (W. Va. 2001).
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law masters to enter enforceable orders imposing sanctions, including incarceration, for indirect civil contempt for failure to pay child support." 475 The circuit
court answered this question in the affirmative. 47 6 The second question was
whether these orders, even if permitted under the West Virginia Code, were
477 The circuit court also answered this question in the affirmaconstitutional.
478
tive.
After making sure the questions were properly before the court, the
court invoked its power to reformulate the question as follows:
Under the provisions of the West Virginia Constitution, are
family law masters, serving through December 31, 2001, in the
family court division of the circuit courts pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 51, Article 2A of the West Virginia Code, judicial officers, having the authority to enter enforceable orders
indirect civil
imposing sanctions, including incarceration, for
47 9
contempt of a court order to pay child support?
The facts of the case revolve around two family law masters serving
Morgan and Jefferson Counties. 48 These family law masters did not set any
contempt hearings for failures to pay alimony or child support, and the BCSE
petitioned the Circuit Court to issue a writ of mandamus to order the family law
masters to "conduct civil contempt proceedings. . . to enter orders in those cases
instead of recommending them to the circuit court for entry, and to impose incarceration in appropriate cases." 48 1 The circuit court granted the writ of man482
The
damus, and the family law masters filed a motion for consideration.
48 3
court.
the
to
questions
certified
two
the
sent
then
court
lower
Using a de novo standard of review, the court decided that family law
masters do not have the power to enter such orders. 4 84 The Unified Family
Court Amendment to the state constitution creates a system to rule on family

475

Id. at 776.

476

Id.

477

Id.

478

Id.

479

Wertman, at 775.

480

Id.

481

Id at 776.

482

Id.

483

Id.

4M

Wertman. at 777-78.
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law matters. 485 Before this amendment it was clear that family law masters
were not judicial officers. 486 However, even after the amendment, family law
masters are not "constitutionally vested with judicial power" and "serve only as
assistants to the circuit courts... in carrying out their functions.''487 Because the
power to enter contempt orders is solely a power of the court, and because famorder, the family law
ily law masters have no power to enter a final and binding
488
masters are not empowered to enter contempt orders.
7.

Stewart v. Stewart

In Stewart v. Stewart,489 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
reviewed whether mental cruelty was present and also reviewed determinations
of child support and alimony. In this case, Richard Stewart and Willa Kay
Stewart were married on May 27, 1972, and had three children, only one of
. . 490
Willa Kay Stewart worked part-time
whom is still under the age of majority.
at the beginning of the marriage, but when her children were born she became a
full-time homemaker. Richard Stewart is a partner in an accounting firm. After
twenty-two years of marriage, the Stewarts separated and Mrs. Stewart filed for
divorce on the grounds of mental cruelty and irreconcilable differences. Mr.
Stewart had been seen in the company of a blonde female and had been observed kissing her in public. Mr. Stewart said she was his running companion
and he only kissed her to reassure her when she found out that she had breast
cancer.

491

The family law master granted Mrs. Stewart's divorce on the grounds of
mental cruelty, gave Mrs. Stewart custody of the one child who was still a minor, ordered child support, and ordered $4,488 per month in permanent alimony. 4 92 Also, Mr. Stewart was ordered to pay her one-half interest in the accounting partnership and her attorney and expert witness fees. Richard Stewart
challenged the finding of mental cruelty, the award of permanent alimony, the
amount of the alimony, and the order to pay his wife's attorney and expert witness fees. The circuit court upheld the finding of mental cruelty and upheld the
award of permanent alimony, but lowered the amount of alimony to $3,837 per
485

W.VA. CONST. ART. VIII,

486

W.VA. CONST. ART. VIII, § 1.

487
488

Wertman, at 778.
Id. at 778-79.

489

550 S.E.2d 86 (W. Va. 2001).

490

Id. at 88.

491

Id.
Id.

492

§ 16.
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month. 493 The court also upheld the award of attorney's and expert witness
fees. Mr. Stewart appealed these findings to the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals.
The court began by noting that the standard of review for reviewing determinations of the lower court this type of case is three-pronged: 1) "underlying
findings of fact should be reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard," 2)
"questions of law should be reviewed de novo," and 3) "questions of statutory
construction should be reviewed de novo." 49 4 Additionally, what constitutes
mental cruelty depends on the circumstances.4 9 5 Conduct "which humiliates and
embarrasses the other party and exposes the other party to public mockery of the
marriage to such an extent that it tended to destroy the other party's mental and
emotional well-bein is adequate to establish fault sufficient to support an
award of alimony."4
Based on the facts of the case, the court held that the
finding of the trial court was not clearly erroneous and therefore affirmed the
finding of mental cruelty.
On the question of whether alimony should be permanent, Mr. Stewart
believed that Mrs. Stewart was entitled, at most, to rehabilitative and not permanent alimony. 497 The court noted that these matters are within the sound discretion of the court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless it clearly appears that
such discretion has been abused. 498 Rehab alimony is used "mainly where a
younger dependent spouse entered the marriage with marketable skills, which
then deteriorated through non-use," or capability for self-support developed
through training or academic study. Key factors are potential work skills of the
spouse requesting alimony and whether that type of work was available, as well
as the age and health of the requesting spouse.
In this case Mrs. Stewart
was fifty, was his wife for twenty-two years, and did not have a significant work
history. Also, there was no evidence that her board of regents degree combined
with any additional education or training would enable her to become permanently employed. 50 Therefore, the court concluded that the findings regarding
the permanency alimony were not erroneous and that the circuit judge did not
abuse his discretion.

493

Id.

494

Id. at 89 (citing Burnside v. Burnside, 460 S.E.2d 264 (W. Va. 1995)).

Stewart, 550 S.E.2d at 89. (citing Thacker v. Thacker, 23 S.E.2d 64, syl. pt. I (W. Va.
1942)).
496
Id. (quoting Dyer v. Tsapsis, 249 S.E.2d 509 (W. Va. 1978)).
495

497

id. at 90.

498

Id. (citing Nichols v. Nichols, 236 S.E.2d 36 (W. Va. 1977)).

499

Id. (citing Molnar v. Molnar, 314 S.E.2d 73 (W. Va. 1984)).

50

Stewart, 550 S.E.2d at 90.
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Regarding the amount of the alimony, the court did rule that the trial
court erred in granting $3,837 per month in permanent alimony when Mr. Stewart only received $6,000 per month in income. The trial court and family law
master had based alimony awards on an income of $12,746/month. The court
concluded that accounting partnership was worth $200,000 and gave Mrs. Stewart $100,000, but $6000 of Mr. Stewart's $12,000 income went to retire obligations arising out of the partnership interest. The West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals had previously ruled: "When values are computed for specific simple assets for the purpose of marital distribution, the rule is that the indebtedness
owed against the asset should be deducted from its fair market value." 50 1 The
court said that it was not clear that the valuation of the partnership took into
account the debts of the partnership, so it appeared on the face of the record that
the court abused its discretion in basing the alimony on the $12,000 per month
in income. Therefore, on the determination of alimony, the judgment of the
circuit court was reversed and remanded for additional findings of fact and a
recalculation deducting amount Mr. Stewart does not receive but which goes to
the partnership debt.
Finally, the court upheld the payment of his wife's attorney's fees and
5 2
court costs, finding that the circuit court judge had not abused his discretion. 0
Fees are awarded when "a party has incurred attorney fees and costs unnecessarily because the opposing party has asserted unfounded claims or defenses for
vexatious, wanton, or oppressive purposes. ' 5° 3 The purpose of the statutory
language was to enable a spouse who didn't have financial resources to obtain
reimbursement for costs and fees.5 U4 The evidence in this case showed that the
wife received a majority of illiquid assets, practically making it impossible for
her to meet her cost and fee obligations. Consequently, the circuit court's order
was affirmed as to the finding of mental cruelty, the award of permanent alimony, and the award of attorney and expert's fees. The judgment was reversed
and remanded as to the amount of alimony for a recalculation of the amount of
Mr. Stewart's income
taking into account obligations arising out of the account50 5
ing partnership.
8.

Edwards v. Edwards

In Edwards v. Edwards,506 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
had to review a circuit court decision to change the beginning date of child sup501 Id. at 91 (quoting Kimble v Kimble, 411 S.E.2d 472 (W. Va. 1991)).
502

Id. at 92 (citing Bond v. Bond, 109 S.E.2d 16 (W. Va. 1959)).

503

W. VA. CODE § 48-2-13(a)(6)(B) (2001).

504 Stewart, 550 S.E.2d at 92 (citing Bettinger v. Bettinger, 396 SE 2d 709 (W. Va. 1990)).
505
Id. at 92-93.
506

547 S.E.2d 249 (W. Va. 2001).
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port payments. In this case, Rhonda and Gregory Edwards were married in
1978. Mr. Edwards filed for divorce in 1994. Two children resulted from the
marriage. The family law master recommended an order in 1995. The parties
sought review of that order and the circuit court remanded it back for a supplemental hearing which did not take place until October 1997. A new recommended order was prepared in June 1998 and was reviewed again by the circuit
court. It was again remanded for a second supplemental hearing. On February
13, 1999 the family law master again recommended an order. It suggested that
custody was to be given to Rhonda Edwards, and Gregory Edwards was to pay
child support in the amount of $463 per month. However, the date on which the
payments were to begin was left unclear. The circuit court reviewed the order
and entered it with two changes on December 30, 1999. The dates in the recommended order regarding child support and alimony payments were drawn
through and replaced with the date October 1, 1999. The circuit court provided
no reasoning for the changes. 50 7 Rhonda Edwards appealed the order of the
circuit court.
The court had to decide whether the circuit court have the authority to
alter the dates upon which Mr. Edwards was required to begin paying alimony
and child support. 50 8 The court reversed the circuit court's order and remanded
the case for further proceedings. The court set out the standard regarding review
of family law master's findings of fact from Stephen H. v. Sherry L.H.:509 "A
circuit court should review findings of fact made by a family law master only
under a clearly erroneous standard, and it should 5review
the application of law
10
standard."
discretion
of
abuse
an
to the facts under
The court noted that the circuit court cannot substitute its own findings
merely because it is not in agreement with the family law master. 5 11 Under
West Virginia Code section 48A-4-20(c), the circuit court must set out its own
findings in conclusions in writing if it changes a family law master's recommendation. The circuit court did not comply with this requirement and changed
the dates without making factual findings or conclusions. Thus, the court reversed the order. It also noted that when relief such as alimony or child support
is granted, Rule 23 of the Rules of Practice and Procedure for Family Court
2000 mandates that the relief is to be retroactive to the date of service of the
motion for relief unless good cause exists for adopting a different date. 5 12 Here,
the circuit court left the Supreme Court of Appeals without a basis for reviewing
507

Id. at 249-50.

508

Id.

509 465 S.E.2d 841, syl. pt. 1 (W. Va. 1995).
510

Id. at 250.

512

Id. at 250-51.

512

Id.
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its reasoning
or any findings which may have indicated good cause for the date
513
changes.
E.

Review of Decisions of the DHHR: State ex rel. Aaron M. and Anthony
H. v. Dep't of Health & Human Resources

In State ex. rel, Aaron M. and Anthony H. v. Dep't of Health & Human
Resources,5 14 Anthony H and Aaron M were abused and neglected children.
The parental rights of their mother were taken away and their maternal grandmother was granted permanent custody. Also, the court ordered DHHR to provide medical care, treatment and services for the physical emotional and psychological needs of the children. The children received therapy from Wellspring
Family Services for three years until the therapist there felt she did not have
enough expertise to deal with the children's myriad of problems - attention
deficit hyperactivity disorder, fetal alcohol syndrome,
depression, sexual abuse
5 15
disorder.
attachment
and
pyromania,
as a child,
The children's Multidisciplinary Treatment Team decided that Anthony
should be evaluated by Denise Flint, a child therapist with Coddington & Associates known to be an expert in attachment disorders. The circuit court ordered
that Anthony receive therapy from Ms. Flint for $75/hr. and that DHHR
promptly pay.516 There was an outstanding bill of $2,522.50 and Ms. Flint refused to treat him until it was paid. She filed a motion for contempt, but DHHR
paid her what was due and owing and the motion was withdrawn. At the next
six month review, she had diagnosed him with post-traumatic stress disorder,
attention deficit disorder and reactive attachment disorder. The court approved
a fee for her services of $90/hour. Again, there was an undue bill for $1,530.
The DHHR said that the bill would only be paid at the Medicaid rate. The
Guardian ad litem then filed a petition5 17for a writ of mandamus to compel the
DHHR to pay Ms. Flint's past due bill.
A "writ of mandamus will not issue unless three elements coexist - 1) a
clear legal right in the petitioner to the relief sought, 2) a legal duty on the part
of the respondent to do the thing which the petitioner seeks to compel, and 3)
the absence of another adequate remedy. ' 5 18 The court held that while Ms. Flint
was entitled to payment of her services, she was not entitled to reimbursement in
excess of the Medicaid rate. The office she worked in had an agreement to ac513

Id.

514

2001 W. Va. LEXIS 40 * 40 (Jan. 9, 2001).

515

Id. at *3-*4.

516

Id. at *3-*5.

517

Id.

518

Id. at *5-*6 (citing State ex. rel. Kucera v. City of Wheeling, 170 S.E.2d 367, syl. pt. 2 (W.

Va. 1969)).
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cept Medicaid rates for Dr. Coddington's services and the agreement provided
that "[t]he provider shall provide for the compliance of subcontractors with applicable federal requirements and assurances." Also, 42 C.F.R. § 447.15 (1985)
states that:
A state plan must provide that the Medicaid agency must limit
participation in the Medicaid program to providers who accept,
as payment in full, the amount paid by the agency plus any deductible, coinsurance or
co-payment required by the plan to be
5 19
paid by the individual.
The court then stated that the parties disagree as to whether Ms. Flint is
an employee or independent contractor, but found that regardless she could not
be paid above Medicaid rates for her services. 52 The court granted the writ of
mandamus and ordered DHH4R to pay for her services at the Medicaid rate, credited by any excess of the Medicaid rate she received in prior billings. 52 1 Also,
the court held that the children's grandmother could not be charged for the difference between the Medicaid rates and the agreed upon rates because, under
West Virginia Code section 16-29D-4, another source cannot522be billed for the
difference when Medicaid pays less than the agreed upon rate.
F.

Statutory Enactments
1.

Senate Bill 24

The purpose of this act is to establish children's centers for the monitoring of custodial responsibility. 523 The act provides exclusions, requires promulgation of rules, sets standards for centers, requires certification, requires contracts for the use of centers, authorizes evaluation of centers, authorizes suspension or revocation of certifications, permits representations upon certification,
prohibits false representation of certification through provision of
penalties, and
5 24
allows courts to order use of centers and require payment of fees.
Section 1001 is the Legislative findings: an increasing number of children live with one parent and have been exposed to violence in the home, and it
is in the best interests of children that the exercise of custodial responsibility,
including the exchange of children, be monitored in order to observe and record
519

Id. (citing 42 C.F.R. § 447.15 (1985)).

520

Id. at *7-*8.

521

Id.

522

Id.

523

S.B. 24, 2001 Leg., 75th Sess. (W. Va. 2001).

524

See id.
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it and discourage/prevent inappropriate conduct. 525 This act provides for safe
and neutral centers to monitor the exercise of custodial responsibility. Section
1002 provides exclusions. The centers are not applicable to therapeutic visitation exchanges or any activity conducted by the state or others in abuse and neglect proceedings pursuant to 49-6 or 49-6a in which assessment, evaluation,
formulation
of a treatment plan, case management, counseling, therapy, etc.
526
occur.

Section 1003 provides that a board shall propose rules by consulting
with judges, magistrates,
law-enforcement
officers, etc. and other individuals it
S 527
...
deems appropriate.
At a minimum the rules should include physical facility
requirements, including ADA accommodations, requirements for qualification
and training for the centers staff and for the evaluators of the centers, the period
of certification and the fees. 528 Section 1004 provides that every center shall
require the persons using the center to sign a written529
contract that use of the
services can be terminated for violation of the contract.
Section 1005 provides for certification and revocation or suspension of
certification of the centers. 53 The board shall accept applications and grant or
deny expeditiously, may direct an evaluation of center that has applied for certification, or that already has been certified, to make sure that
the center complies
• ••531
and that it has the ability to monitor custodial responsibility.
Evaluators may
be members of the board, designees of the board or peer evaluation by other
centers. 532 If the board finds that the center is not complying with the article,
the rules pursuant
ioeftu
utlll liaw, it May susn.Cd1U or revVk cctLitin.%
Section 1006 provides that certified centers may represent their certification. 534 No person may represent that a center is certified if it is not. To do so
is a misdemeanor with a fine of no more than $500. 535 Section 1007 provides
that judges or magistrates may order persons to apply as a condition of custody
and to comply with the terms and conditions of the services. Centers don't have
525

W. VA. CODE § 48-26-1001 (2001).

526

W. VA. CODE

527

W. VA. CODE § 48-26-1003 (2001).

528

Id.

529

W, VA. CODE § 48-26-1004 (2001).

530

W. VA. CODE § 48-26-1005 (2001).

531

Id.

532

Id.

533

Id.

534

W. VA. CODE §48-26-1006 (2001).

535

Id.

§ 48-26-1002 (2001).
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to perform services in excess of their capacity or scope. Judges may also require person to pay a reasonable amount for the use based on ability to pay and
other criteria. If adult parties agree to the use of the center, they may provide
services to those not ordered to use the center. 536 This bill was approved on
May 1, 2001, it passed on April 13, 2001, and went into effect 90 days from
537
passage.
2.

Senate Bill 59

This section amends and reenacts West Virginia Code section 48-2-402
which relates to persons authorized to celebrate marriages. 538 The secretary of
state must establish a central registry of persons authorized to celebrate marriages in West Virginia. 539 All persons meeting the qualifications shall be listed
in the registry. 54 Prior to October 1, 2001, every county clerk must submit to
the secretary of state a list of every person authorized to celebrate marriages by
order issued in his/her respective counties
since 1960. The secretary of state
54 1
registry.
the
in
names
will put those
The section states the qualifications of religious representatives authorized to celebrate marriages. Those qualifications include: being at least eighteen
years of age; having authorization to perform marriages by a church, synagogue,
spiritual assembly, or religious organization; and being in regular communion
with the church, synagogue,542spiritual assembly or religious organization of
which he or she is a member.
From September 1, 2001, the secretary of state will make an order authorizing a person who is a religious representative to celebrate the rights of
marriage in all counties in West Virginia. The registration fee must be paid first
in order to receive such order. The fee is established by the secretary of state
and may not exceed $25. A person must give bond in the amount of $1,500
with surety approved by the commission. This bond can be avoided by providing proof that the religious representative is ordained or authorized by his/her
respective church, synagogue, spiritual assembly or religious organization.
All money received will be placed in a special revenue revolving fund
543
entitled the "Marriage Celebrants Registration Fee Administration Fund."
§48-26-1007 (2001).

536

W. VA. CODE

537

S. B. 24, 2001 Leg., 75th Sess. (W. Va. 2001).

538

S. B. 59, 2001 Leg., 75th Sess. (W. Va. 2001).

539

W. VA. CODE § 42-2-202 (2001).

540

Id.

541
542

Id.
Id.

543

Id.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2002

69

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 104, Iss. 3 [2002], Art. 9

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 104

The funds will be used to pay expenses incurred by the implementation and operation of the registry program.
Marriages performed by a person authorized by law to celebrate marriages cannot be invalidated on the sole basis that the person was not listed in
the registry. 545 The registry is to be updated periodically and sent to every
county clerk. This54amendment
was effective ninety days after its April 14,
6
2001 passage date.
3.

Senate Bill 157

This is an act to amend and reenact W.Va. Code 18-1-1, by providing
certain additional definitions. 54 7 The significant modifications to this code section are as follows: (i) The addition of a definition for "social worker," which is
defined as "a nonteaching school employee who, at a minimum, possesses an
undergraduate degree in social work from an accredited institution of higher
learning and who provides various professional social work services, activities
or methods as defined by the state board for the benefit of students" 54 8 ; (k) The
addition of a definition for "career clusters," which is defined as a "broad grouping of related occupations";549 (1) The addition of a definition for "work-based
learning," which is defined as "structured activity that correlates with and is
mutually supportive of the school-based learning of the student and includes
specific objectives to be learned by the student as a result of the activity";550
(in Trhe additio, of a de, hntion for "school-aged iuvenile," which is defined as
"any individual who is entitled to attend or who, if not placed in a residential
facility, would be entitled to attend public schools in accordance with: (1) Section five, article two of this chapter; (2) sections fifteen and eighteen, article five
of this chapter; or (3) section one, article twenty of this chapter";551 (n) The
addition of a definition for "student with disability," which is defined as "an
exceptional child, other than gifted, pursuant to section one, article twenty of
this chapter"; 552 (o) The addition of a definition for "high density county,"
which is defined as "a county whose ratio of student population to square miles
W4

Id.

545

Id.

546

S. B. 59, 2001 Leg., 75th Sess. (W. Va. 2001).

547 S. B. 204, 2001 Leg., 75th Sess. (W. Va. 2001).
548

W. VA. CODE § 18-1-1 (2002).

549

Id.

550

Id.

551

Id.

552

Id.
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is greater than the state average ratio as computed by the state department of
education"; 5 53 and (p) The addition of a definition for "casual deficit," which is
defined as, "a deficit of not more than 3 percent 554
of the approved levy estimate or
a deficit that is nonrecurring from year to year."
4.

Senate Bill 640

This act amends section 44A of the West Virginia Guardianship and
Conservatorship Act, by adding a new section that provides for the filing of a
petition for the appointment of a guardian or conservator of a minor.5 5 The
petition may now be filed if the minor is at least seventeen years and ten months
of age and would qualify as a "protected person." 556 A protected person is defined as, "an adult individual, eighteen years of age or older, who has been
found by a court, because of mental impairment, to be unable to receive and
evaluate information effectively or to respond to people, events, and environments to such an extent that the individual lacks the capacity: (A) To meet the
essential requirements for his or her health, care, safety, habilitation, or therapeutic needs without the assistance or protection of a guardian; or (B) to manage
property or financial affairs or to provide for his or her support or for the sup5 57
port of legal dependents without the assistance or protection of a conservator.
Before the enactment of this statute, the petition could only be filed after the protected person had turned eighteen years old. This statute further provides that the hearing shall only occur no sooner than fourteen days before the
minor's eighteenth birthday if the trier of fact is the mental hygiene conmissioner and no more than seven days prior to the birthday if a circuit judge conducts the hearing.
G.

Conclusion

In 2001, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals decided a number
of controversial cases dealing with topics ranging from grandparents' visitation
rights to the quality of the public schools in West Virginia. The court's validation of grandparents' visitation rights in Moats is notable because the United
State Supreme Court recently invalidated a grandparents' visitation rights statute
in Washington, and the validity of similar statutes has come into question across
the nation. West Virginia has joined the increasing number of states across the
country which have set up child custody monitoring centers.
553 Id.
554 Id.
555

S.B. 640, 2001 Leg., 75th Sess. (W. Va. 2001).

556

W.VA. CODE § 44A-2-1a (2001).

557

W.VA. CODE § 44A-1-4.
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Many of this year's family law cases dealt with the allocation of child
support and alimony awards reflecting the complexities in this are of the law.
While there are no broad themes running through the case opinions, the court
child is the polar star by which
remained mindful that, "the best interests of the
558
guided."
be
must
children
affecting
all matters
Tammie Clark
Parween S. Mascari
Amy Moats
Kristina Thomas
IV.

A.

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

Introduction

In 2000 and 2001, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals decided
numerous cases that impact the practice of environmental law in West Virginia.
Also, the West Virginia Legislature enacted and amended several statutes associated with surface mining, water pollution control, taxes on synthetic coal, and
the promotion of clean coal technology. This survey, in particular, evaluates the
latest environmental cases pertaining to the effects of promises or statements
made in mining permits pursuant to preexisting waivers of the right of subjacent
support, to permit requirements for coal mining incidental to the development of
land for other use, to judicial ascertainment clauses in mineral leases, to the termination of mineral leases upon a cessation of production, and to the delegation
of damages involving dismissed WVSCMRA actions prior to judicial review.
B.

The Effect of Promisesor Statements made in Mining PermitsRequired
by West Virginia Surface Mining Control and ReclamationAct on Preexisting Waivers of the Right of Subjacent Support

The Supreme Court of Appeals's decision in Antco, Inc., John Antulov,
5 5 9 illustrates
Margaret Antulov and Steve Antulov v. Dodge Fuel Corporation
the interplay between the terms and conditions of mining permits and preexisting deeds waiving subjacent support. The decision in Dodge Fuel indicates that
the terms and conditions of mining permits, rather than waivers in preexisting
deeds, determine whether coal operators in underground mining operations are
required to provide subjacent support to surface owners. In its mining permit
application, Dodge Fuel Corporation promised to provide subjacent support to
the surface owner. The court held that the promise to provide subjacent support
"may have, in effect, invalidated or limited [Dodge Fuel's] otherwise valid
558

In re Brian D., 461 S.E.2d 429 at syl. pt. 7.

559

550 S.E.2d 622 (W. Va. 2001).
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waiver of subjacent support. 56 ° To avoid invalidating waivers of subjacent
support, the court's decision in Dodge Fuel suggests that coal operators should
not, as a condition of their mining permit, promise to provide subjacent support.
Even for permit applications involving properties where surface owners have
validly waived the right to subjacent support, violation of a promise, made in a
mining permit application, to provide subjacent support will be regarded as a
violation of the mining permit. Violation of the mining permit will be regarded
as a violation of statute and
therefore constitute prima facie evidence of negli56 1
gence by the coal operator.
The plaintiffs in Dodge Fuel, Antco, Inc., et al., purchased 110 acres
from Consolidation Coal Company in 1986. The deed "contained a reservation
of the mining rights in favor of the grantor." 562 The deed also contained a specific waiver waiving "subjacent support, and "any liability for any damages
caused by subsidence that might result when the coal beneath the property was
mined." 5 63 In 1993, the defendant, Dodge Fuel Corporation, acquired the rights
to the coal under the property owned by Antco, Inc. Pursuant to West Virginia
mining regulations, in its permit application Dodge detailed the possible consequences of its mining activity on "mining-related subsidence." In particular, in
conditions six and seven of an attachment to its permit application, Dodge stated
that "if subsidence causes material damage or reduces the value of reasonably
foreseeable use of the surface lands, [it would] restore the land to a condition
capable of supporting uses it was capable of supporting before subsidence regardless of the right to subside." In addition, Dodge promised that the plaintiffs' quarry would "be protected by leaving at least 50% of the total coal in
place" in the section of the mine extending beneath the limestone quarry.564
The permit was approved by the West Virginia Department of Environmental
Protection ("DEP"). After issuance of the mining permit, the defendant began
mining coal under the plaintiffs' limestone quarry. The plaintiffs argued that the
mining activity resulted in subsidence which damaged their equipment at the
limestone quarry, "making it economically unfeasible to continue their quarry
operations."
The case was brought before the Circuit Court of Marion County. The
plaintiffs alleged that the subsidence resulting in the damage to their quarrying
equipment was caused by mining activities conducted by Dodge Fuel Corporation in violation of statements six and seven included in its mining permit application, and that violation of the mining permit made Dodge Fuel Corporation
strictly liable for damage caused by the subsidence. Alternatively, the plaintiffs
560

Id. at 628.

561

Id. at 634.

562

Id. at 625.

563

Id.

564

Id. at 626. (emphasis added)
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argued that violation of the terms of the mining permit were violations of statute
and therefore could be used to establish a primafacie case of negligence against
Dodge. Dodge argued that because of the preexisting waiver in the deed, "despite any statements made in its permit application ... it had the right to mine
and to cause the land to subside, within limits of mining law, without any liability for any damage to [the plaintiff s] quarry equipment. ' 56 5 The trial court held
that the surface owners had waived subjacent support and granted summary
judgment to Dodge. The plaintiffs appealed.
The plaintiffs' argument revolved around the effect of the enactment of
the West Virginia Surface Control and Mining and Reclamation Act
("WVSMCRA"), West Virginia Code section 22-3-1 on preexisting waivers to
subjacent support. Because the plaintiffs asked the court to "review the conduct
of [Dodge Fuel] in light of' WVSMCRA, the court first had to determine if the
provisions of WVSMCRA applied to subsidence caused by undergroundmining
operations. The court held that "even though the Act contains the word 'surface' in its title, it clearly still applies to the facts of this case. ' 566 The court
noted in the Act, the definition of "surface mining operation" included surface
567
operations and surface impacts incidental to an underground coal mine."
Although the court noted that its decision to apply the WVSMCRA to underground coal operations "seem[ed] somewhat at odds" with its holding in Rose v.
Oneida Coal Co., Inc.,56 8 where the court held that WVSMCRA did not apply
to the effects of underground mining, it did not attempt to distinguish the facts
in this case from those in Rosa v. Oneida Coal Co., Inc.
After determining that the WvSIVICRA applied to the underground cual
operations in this case, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals addressed
the three remaining key issues: the validity of the waiver of subjacent support in
the deed, the effect of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 on the liability standard for
subsidence damage caused by underground coal operations, and the effect of the
promises made by the defendant in the mining permit application on the preexisting waiver included in the deed. Concerning the validity of the waiver of
subjacent support in the deed, the court noted that waivers of subjacent support
are valid "provided that the language of the deed and the circumstances surrounding the conveyance show a clear intention by the surface owner to waive
such support. 569 "Although mining compan[ies were] the beneficiary of broad
form waivers in deeds drafted in the early 1900's", [the court has held that]
broad form waivers [are] not sufficient" to waive rights granted by the

565

Id. at 629.

566

Id. at 628.

567

Id. (citing W. VA. CODE § 22-3-3 (2000) (emphasis added).

568

466 S.E.2d 794 (W. Va. 1995).

569

Antco, Inc., 550 S.E.2d at 629.
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WVSMCRA.570 However, because the deed in this case was executed in 1986,
and because both parties were 57
experienced
in the coal mining business, the court
1
held that the waiver was valid.
Because the court found that the waiver of subjacent support was valid,
it next addressed the two claims put forth by the plaintiffs, (1) that the Energy
Policy Act of 1992 created a strict liability standard for subsidence damage, and
(2) that promises made by the defendant in the mining permit application became terms or conditions of the permit and that, regardless of a previous waiver
by deed, violation of the terms or conditions of the mining permit was a violation of statute and could be considered prima facie evidence of negligence
against the defendant. The court first addressed the plaintiffs claim that the Energy Policy Act of 1992 created a strict liability standard. The court noted that
this claim "[e]ssentially .. .assert[s] that changes in federal law have invalidated all waivers of subjacent support. ' 572 In response to this claim, the court
noted that the section of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 relied on by the plaintiffs dealt only with damage caused to "residential dwellings and noncommercial buildings." 573 The court held that "because the dispute [in this
case] concerns a commercial rock crusher," not a residential dwelling or noncommercial building, the strict574liability standard established by the Energy Policy Act of 1992 did not apply.
The court noted that the "cynosure of this case [was] how Dodge's actions [in applying for the permit] may have, in effect, invalidated or limited" the
preexisting waiver of subjacent support. 575 The plaintiffs argued that violation
of the terms of the mine permit constituted a violation of statute and therefore
576
could "serve as prima facie evidence of the mining company's negligence."
In response, the mining company (i.e. Dodge) argued that it had the right to be
negligent because of the waiver in the deed. The court held that to "acce5 77t
would be to eviscerate the entire permitting process."
Dodge's argument ...
Regardless of valid preexisting waivers, a "mining company may choose ...to
570

Id. at 630. See also Cogar v. Sommerville, 379 S.E.2d 764 (W. Va. 1989).

571

Id.
Id. at 630.

572

573

Id. at 633.

Id. The plaintiffs also argued that if the federal rules did not apply because they specifically
mention noncommercial structures, the state rules would apply and provide strict liability because
the state law can afford the surface owner greater protection than the federal rules and the state
rules do not specifically mention noncommercial structures. The court noted that it was not clear
if the state rules only applied to noncommercial structures but because it found for the plaintiffs
on other grounds, it did not address the scope of the state rules in this opinion.
574

575

Id. at 628.

576

Id. at 633.

577

Id. at 634.
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promise certain activity that the law does not absolutely require. But even if not
required by law, once the state accepts and approves of those promises, they
become the terms and conditions of the permit, and the mining company must
honor them." 57 8 The "terms and conditions of a mining permit issued pursuant
to the [WVSMCRA] may limit rights that a mining company otherwise would
have enjoyed. ' 5 79 The court noted that because a mining company must have a
valid mining permit to mine, "violation of the terms or conditions of a permit
issued pursuant to the [WVSMCRA] is... a violation of statute." 580 The court
concluded its opinion by noting that "any violation of statute is considered
prima facie evidence of negligence," and that if the plaintiff can establish that
the defendant violated a statute, the case turns on an issue of fact to be decided
by the jury, rather than an issue of law to be decided by the judge. Because the
plaintiffs alleged that Dodge violated its mining permit, the inquiry in the case
involved issues of material fact that were not appropriate for summary judgement. The court remanded the case to the circuit court.
C.

Permit Requirementsfor Coal Mining Activity Incidental to Development of Landfor Commercial,Residential, Industrial,or Civic Use

The recent decision by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in
DK Excavating, Inc. v. Miano, Director, West Virginia Division of Environmental Protection 58 1 clarified the effect of West Virginia Code section 22-33(u)(2)(ii), an amendment to West Virginia's surface mining regulation plan, on
the requirement of permits for coai extraction incidental to land development.
The court held that West Virginia's amendment could not take effect as part of
the State's program until the federal Office of Surface Mining (hereafter
"OSM") approved the amendment. Because the OSM denied approval of the
amendment, and because "it is beyond dispute that once a state plan is approved
under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, any subsequent
amendments to such plan do not become effective until approved by the OSM,"
West Virginia's proposed amendment excluding the need for permits for extraction incidental to land development did not amend West Virginia's surface mining plan. 5 82 Coal mining operations are not excluded from the permit requirements of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act simply because the
coal extraction is incidental to land development.
The plaintiff, DK Excavating, Inc., ("DK") sought approval from the
DEP to extract and sell coal, without a permit, from a two-acre site where it
578

Id.

579

Id.

580

Id.

581

549 S.E.2d 280 (W. Va. 2001).
Id. at 285.

582
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intended to construct an equipment shop. 583 The DEP informed DK that, under
current law, a mining permit was required for the coal extraction even if the coal
extraction was incidental to land development on a small site. DK appealed the
decision of the DEP to the West Virginia Surface Mine Board, where the decision of the DEP was affirmed. DK then appealed the decision of the West Virginia Surface Mine Board to the Circuit Court of Nicholas County. The circuit
court held that, based on the 1997 amendment to West Virginia Code section
22-3-3, the mining activities to be conducted by DK did not fall under the definition of "surface mining" and therefore no mining permit was required. 584 The
DEP appealed the decision of the circuit court to the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals.
The focus of the case before the court centered on the effect of a 1997
amendment to the WVSMCRA. The amendment narrowed the definition of
"surface mining" under the WVSMCRA to expressly exclude "coal extraction
authorized as an incidental part of development of land for commercial, residential, industrial, or civic use., 585 W.Va. Code § 22-3-3(u)(2)(ii). Both parties
agreed "that the coal extraction at issue... [came] within the ambit of this statutory definition, which is referred to as the 'private construction exemption' .,586
The issue was the enforceability of the statutory private construction exemption
created by W.Va. Code § 22-3-39(u)(2)(ii). The DEP argued that, because the
OSM denied approval of the amendment creating the private construction exemption, the amendment did not validly amend the WVSMCRA. The court
quickly resolved this issue in favor of the DEP, holding that "[u]nder federal
law, any subsequent changes to [an] approved state plan must ... be approved by
OSM."' 587 Changes to laws or regulations within a state plan approved under
SMCRA "do not take effect for purposes of a state program until approved as an
amendment by the [OSM]. ' 5 8 Because the OSM denied approval of the
amendment creating the private construction exemption, the amendment did not
affect the WVSMCRA; the DEP and West Virginia Surface Mining Board were
correct in holding that a permit was 589
required, even if the coal extraction at issue
development.
land
to
was incidental

583

Id. at 282.

584 Id.
595

W. VA. CODE § 22-3-3(u)(2)(ii).

586

DK Excavating, 549 S.E.2d at 282.

587

Id. at 283. See also Schultz v. ConsolidationCoal Co., 474 S.E.2d 467 (W. Va. 1996).

588

Id. See also 30 C.F.R. § 732.17(g).

589 Id. at 283. OSM denied approval of the amendment because it found that the "West Virginia program amendment propose[d] precisely the same blanket exemption [for private construction] which Congress explicitly rejected." Id.
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DK argued that the preemption provision under SMCRA was not automatic and that once a state passed an amendment to the state plan approved under SMCRA, the federal government must affirmatively act to invalidate the
state amendment. 59 The court held that "this argument proves indefensible
when viewed against the language of 30 C.F.R. § 732.17(g), which clearly states
that no change to an approved state plan 'shall take effect for purposes of a State
program until approved as an amendment'.''591 State law inconsistent with
SMCRA is "superseded by the provisions of SMCRA. ' 59 2 The court supported
its position by noting that the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution demanded that the laws of the United States be the supreme law of the land.
The court ruled in favor of the DEP, overturning the holding of the circuit court. Amendments to the WVSMCRA can not take effect without approval by OSM. Proposed amendments do not become effective until approved
by the OSM; no affirmative action on the part of the federal government, beyond disapproval of the OSM, is required to prevent a proposed state amendment from effecting a state plan approved under SMCRA. Because the OSM
denied approval of West Virginia's proposed amendment creating a private construction exemption to WVSMCRA, that proposed amendment did not affect the
WVSMCRA. Because the private construction exemption did not become effective in West Virginia, the circuit court erred in holding that DK was not required to obtain a mining permit for coal extraction incidental to its private construction project. Until an amendment containing a private construction exemption is approved by OSM, a permit under WVSMCRA is required93for coal extraction, even if the extraction is incidental to private construction.D.

JudicialAscertainment Clauses, Apportionment ofAttorney Costs and
the Determinationof Royalties in Oil and Gas Leases

The West Virginia
594 Supreme Court of Appeals's decision in Wellman v.
Energy Resources, Inc. will have a significant impact on how property owners and companies involved in the exploration of oil and gas view existing, and
negotiate future oil and gas leases in West Virginia. In Wellman v. Energy Resources, Inc., the court resolved three issues deriving from the breach and resulting termination of an oil and gas lease. The court first declared that "judicial
ascertainment" clauses in oil and gas leases are not enforceable in West Virginia. 59 5 Second, the court joined several other states in declaring that, "unless
590 Id. at 284.
591

Id.

592

Id.

593

Id. at 285.

594 557 S.E.2d 254 (W. Va. 2001).
595 Id. at 261-62.
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the lease provides otherwise," the lessee must bear all costs in the production
and marketing of the product; 596 thereby denouncing recent attempts of oil and
gas producers to charge landowners with a pro-rata share of the various incurred
expenses. 59 7 Finally, the court solidified the policy of the State of West Virginia
598
in supporting conservation through the maximum recovery of oil and gas,
concluding a lessee must afford the lessor a reasonable opportunity to continue
the operation of a capable, producing well,599where the lessee desires to remove
its well equipment from the operative well.
The particular provisions of the lease are extremely critical to the determination of this case, and the results of this decision will undoubtedly shape
the language and negotiations of future oil and gas leases. In short, the appellees, James T. Wellman and Grace Wellman ("Wellman"), held two oil and gas
leases on two tracts of land owned by appellants, Energy Resources, Inc. ("Energy Resources").600 The leases contained provisions stipulating the leases
would run for 10 years and "for so long thereafter as drilling or working operations for oil or gas were conducted." 6 ° 1 Each lease provided that Energy Resources would begin operations for the drilling of one well on the leased tracts
during the operative and primary ten-year term of the lease. 602 In addition, the
leases required Energy Resources to pay a "delay rental" until one well was
operative and, once operative, pay a royalty of one-eighth of the market value of
any gas or oil produced and sold from the properties. 60 3 Importantly, each lease
also contained a "judicial ascertainment clause,"' 604 maintaining that the lease
shall never be forfeited or terminated
until a court determines the lessee failed to
6 5
0
lease.
the
of
obligation
perform an
According to the largely undisputed facts, the court determined that Energy Resources breached the oil and gas leases. 606 Specifically, the court found
Energy Resources did not commence drilling of a well on either tract at any time
during the primary ten-year term of the leases, nor did it pay the delay rental fee
596

Id. at 265.

597 See id. at 264.
598

See id. at 266; see also W.VA. CODE § 22C-9-1 (2000).

599

557 S.E. 2d at 266.

600

Id. at 257.

61

Id.

6M

Id.

603

Id. at 257-58.

Id. at 258. The lessee, Energy Resources, refers to this clause as a "right to cure" clause;
meanwhile, the court prefers to label it as a "judicial ascertainment" clause.
604

605

Id.

6M

See id.
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as proscribed in the leases. 607 Although Energy Resources did rework a previously abandoned well drilled by a prior lessee on one of the tracts, placed it back
in operation during the term of the leases and paid Wellman a royalty of the
sales from that gas, it first subtracted a pro-rata share from the royalty, comprising of the various expenses incurred in producing and bringing the product to
market. 608 Energy Resources paid Wellman a royalty of one-eighth of $.87 for
each thousand cubic feet of gas it sold. However, Energy Resources should
have, as stipulated in the lease, paid a royalty based on the market value of the
gas of one-eighth of $2.22 per thousand cubic feet of gas sold.
The Circuit Court of Logan County, in granting Wellman's motion for
summary judgment, held the leases were terminated due to Energy Resources'
failure "to drill a well on the property within the term of the leases, due to its
failure to pay delay rentals, and due to its failure to pay, a proper one-eighth royalty on the production from the reworked well.
In addition, the court
awarded Wellman substantial damages for Energy Resources' failure to pay the
proper royalties on the gas extracted because it did not show it was entitled to
deduct expenses from the market value of the gas sold. 6 1 The circuit court also
awarded Wellman
pre-judgment interest, post-judgment interest, and attorney's
6 11
fees and costs.
On appeal, Energy Resources first claimed the circuit court's determination that the leases were terminated under the circumstances of the case was
error because the leases contained what it called "right to cure" or "judicial ast~gl-tllllc1lll,
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meet its obligations and until after it had been given an additional time to comply with its obligations. 6 12 In examining other states' treatment of such
clauses 6 13 and assessing West Virginia's public policy concern of judicial economy 6614 , the court explicitly held, based on "compelling public policy reasons,"
that "judicial ascertainment" clauses in oil and gas leases are not enforceable in
West Virginia. 6 15 Further, the court held, in lieu of finding such clauses void
607
608

Id.
Id.

609

Id. at 258.

610

Id.

611

Id. at 258-259.

612

See id. at 259.

613

See Waddle v. Lucky Strike Oil Co., 551 S.W.2d 323 (Tenn. 1977); Lamczyck v. Allen, 134

N.E.2d 753 (1956); Frick-Reid Supply Corporation v. Meers, 52 S.W.2d 115, 118 (Tex. Circ.App.
1932); Smith v. Sun Oil Co., 172 La. 655, 135 So. 15 (1931).
614

See State ex rel. Sowards v. County Commission of Lincoln County, 474 S.E.2d 919

(1996); Glover v. Narick, 400 S.E.2d 816 (1990).
615

Wellman, 557 S.E. 2d at 261-62.
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under public policy, judicial ascertainment clauses "do not preclude a court in
which a controversy over an oil and gas lease 6is16tried from rendering a final
judgment and finally resolving that controversy."
Second, the court, finding persuasive other states' rejections of pro-rata
applications to royalty payments, held, the lessee, in an oil or gas lease, has to
bear all costs incurred in "exploring for, producing, marketing, and transporting
the product to the point of sale." 6 1 In rejecting the pro-rata application to royalty payments, the court adopted the view that, in an oil or gas lease, the lessee
impliedly covenants to market oil and gas produced and, in doing so, the lessee
bears the cost of compliance with this covenant. 6 18 Recognizing that West Virginia has historically required the lessor to bear the cost of complying with
covenants under the lease, the court concluded "that if an oil and gas lease provides for a royalty based on proceeds received by the lessee, unless the lease
provides
otherwise, the lessee must bear all costs" of discovery and produc6 19
tion.
Next, as to the return of the property used in conjunction with the well,
Energy Resources claimed the circuit court erred in failing to require Wellman
to return its equipment used in conjunction with the operative well. Although
generally, a lessee should be permitted to remove its equipment within a reasonable time after the termination of a lease, the court acknowledged several exceptions to this rule. One specific exception alluded to by the court specified that
"a lessee may not remove equipment even if he has abandoned or lost his interest in an oil and gas well if the removal of the equipment destroys a well which
is capable of producing. ' 62° Thus, employing this exception and relying on the
West Virginia Legislature's inclination to favor the conservation and maximum
recovery of oil and gas, 62 1 the court held, "when an oil or gas well remains capable of producing oil or gas at the termination of a lease covering such well," a
lessee desiring to remove the well equipment must allow a lessor, or an agent
chosen by the lessor, a reasonable opportunity
to qualify under the bonding stat62 3
ute 622 to continue the operation of the well.
616

Id. at 262.

617

See id. at 265.

618

Id.; See also Garman v. Conoco, 886 P.2d 652 (Colo. 1994); Wood v. TXO Production

Corp., 854 P.2d 880, 882 (Okla. 1992); Gilmore v. Superior Oil Co., 388 P.2d 602, 606 (Kan.
1964); Warfield Natural Gas Co. v. Allen, 88 S.W.2d 989, 991 (Ky. 1935).
619

557 S.E.2d at 265 (emphasis added).

620

See 4 Howard R. Williams & Charles J. Myers, Oil and Gas Law § 674.2 (2000).

621 See W. VA. CODE § 22C-9-1 (2000).
622

See W. VA. CODE § 22-6-26 (2000).

623

Wellman, 557 S.E.2d at 265. If the lessor decides to so qualify, "a court, upon application

by either party, may determine and order payment for the value of the lessee's equipment, reduce
by the cots of removing such equipment from the leasehold and by the cost of plugging the well
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Calculationof Damages Upon a Termination of a Mineral Lease Upon
an Unexcused Cessation of Production in Violation of the Terms of the
Lease

In Bryan v. Big Two Mile Gas Co.,624 the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals established a method of calculating damages where a party terminates a mineral lease upon an unexcused cessation of production and, thereafter,
resumes production. The decision in Big Two Mile Gas indicates that an oil or
gas company that terminates an oil or gas lease, due to its cessation of production, "must pay to the property owner the value of the gas that was produced
after the lease termination, less a portion of the reasonable costs of production.,,625
The predecessors-in-title to both the appellant, Mrs. Bryan, and the appellee, Big Two Mile Gas Company (hereafter "BTM"), entered into an oil and
gas lease in 1935 that contained a "thereafter" clause, providing that the lease
would last "for the [primary] term of one (1) year and so long thereafter as oil or
gas, or either of them is produced. ' 6 26 The lease also accorded a royalty to the
lessor, equaling "1 cent for every thousand cubic feet of gas produced from the
well. ' 627 A well was drilled, gas production began, and royalty payments were
paid during the primary term of the lease. 628 Indeed, continuous gas production
continued until the period of time at issue.
In 1987, BTM, due to financial restraints, ceased gas production and
cated that BTM also temporarily ceased gas production from the well from November 1979 to April 1980. 630 In 1989, Mrs. Bryan contacted BTM and advised them that she believed that BTM's right to operate the well terminated
upon its cessation of production in 1987. 63 1 Again, in 1991, Mrs. Bryan and her
attorney wrote a letter to BTM in which they asserted that non-production of the
well terminated BTM's right to operate the well. 632 In response, BTM informed

assumed by the lessor." Id.
624
2001 WL 1585653 (W. Va. 2001).
625

Id. at *2.

626

Id.

627

Id.

628

Id.

629

Id. at *3.

630

Id.

631

Id.

632

Id.
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Mrs. Bryan that it had resumed production in 1990.633 Subsequently, BTM sent
Mrs. Bryan a royalty check for the gas produced since production resumed in
1990. 64 However, Mrs. Bryan refused payment and filed suit against BMT in
1993. Specifically, Mrs. Bryan asserted, "BTM had lost its right to operate the
well because of BTM's cessation of production. 635 At trial, Mrs. Bryan claimed
"had terminated BTM's leasehold rights to produce
the cessation of production 636
and sell gas from the well."
The circuit court separated the case into a liability phase and a damages
phase. The jury found BTM has terminated its leasehold rights and determined
that Mrs. Bryan was entitled to a "reasonable royalty" on gas produced after the
1979-1980 cessation. 637 Mrs. Bryan appealed the damages judgment where she
sold from the well
claimed entitlement "to the actual value of the gas taken and
6 38
production."
of
costs
for
deduction
any
after 1979, without
First, the court, finding the lease between BTM and Mrs. Bryan contained a habendum clause, 639 found the law "well-settled" that a lease of this
type "automatically terminates when there is a cessation of mineral production,
unless the cessation ofproduction is excused under the 'temporary cessation of
production doctrine."64° The quintessence of the "temporary cessation of production doctrine" is that a temporary cessation necessary to make repairs or replacements, perform maintenance, or deal with unexpected loss of market, is
excusable and will not automatically terminate a mineral lease, "so long as the
lessee is dillgent in accomplishing the maintenance, repairs, replacements, or
The court held "that a mere temporary cessation of production
marketing."
during the secondary term of a mineral lease that requires production to keep the
lease in effect"--examples include cessations for equipment repairs, technical
problems, reworking operations, unexpected loss of a market, etc.-"does not
result in the automatic termination of the lease if the cessation can be character'642
ized as excusable under the 'temporary cessation of production doctrine.
633

Id.

634

Id.

635

Id.

636

Id.

637

Id.

638

Id.

639

See McCullough Oil, Inc. v. Rezek, 346 S.E.2d 788, syl. pt. 2 (W. Va. 1986).

640

2001 WL 1585653, *4 (W. Va. 2001).

641

Id. at *5.

Id. at *6. The court listed several factors relevant in determining whether a period of cessation of production is excusable. Some of these factors include: "the length of time without production, the reason for the period of cessation, and whether the lessee exercised reasonable diligence to resume production, bearing in mind the continuing affirmative duty of the lessee under
642
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The court found the cessation periods were inexcusable because BMT could
have replaced any malfunctioning equipment in a matter of days during the first
cessation of production in 1979-1980.643 Also, the court concluded that the
nearly three years of cessation during the secondary term of the lease was sufficient time to allow BTM to pursue another market for gas.644 The court found
the jury's determination that both periods of cessation were inexcusable was
6 45
permissible.
Second, as to the issue of damages, the court held:
[w]here a mineral lease has automatically terminated due to an
unexcused period of cessation of production by the lessee, and
mineral production is subsequently resumed by the former lessee without the informed and knowing agreement by the mineral owner to a renewal of the lease and the resumption of production, the former lessee is a trespasser with regard to mineral
production subsequent to the lease's termination, and the mineral owner may recover in damages from the former lessee the
actual valued of the minerals removed after the lease's termination with no deduction for the cost of producing unless the former lessee shows that the renewal of production was the result
64 6
of innocent conduct on his part.
Finding BMT a trespasser after the lease termination in the original cessation of production in 1979, the court concluded the record did not support a
finding that BMT's trespass was willful after the 1979-1980 cessation. However, the court did conclude BMT's trespass was willful after the 1987-1990
cessation. 6 47 Thus, the court appropriated damages with the 1979-1980 cessation as the "value of the gas taken from the well and sold by BTM after the lease
terminated in 1979, less the actual cost of production." 64 8 However, because
BMT was considered a willful trespasser due to Mrs. Bryan's notice to BMT
that she considered BMT as such, calculated the damages associated with the
1987-1990 cessation as "the full value of the gas taken from the well without
649
any deduction for costs of production.
such a lease to product and market minerals to keep the lease in effect." Id.
643

Id.

644

Id.

645

Id.
Id. at *9.

646

648

See id. at *9,n.9.
Id. at *9-*10.

649

Id. at *10.

647
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Delegationof Damages and Award of Costs Involving a WVSCMRA
Action DismissedBefore Judicial Review

F.

In Louden v. West Virginia Division of EnvironmentalProtection,650 the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals construed the West Virginia Surface
Mining Regulation Rules to permit an award of litigation expenses from an action brought pursuant to the WVSCMRA. 65 1 Although the West Virginia Surface Mining Regulation Rules 652 detail the standards for awarding fees and costs
in administrative appeals involving "permitting actions" under WVSCMRA, the
court had never addressed the question as to which party was liable for plaintiffs fees and costs in challenging a permit where a party, presumptively the
company applying for the permit, and not the DEP, changes its position regarding the issuance of the permit.
Initially, the citizens, here the appellees, challenged DEP's decision to
grant Green Valley Coal Company's (hereafter "Green Valley") request for an
amendment to an existing permit to allow Green Valley to inject coal slurry into
an abandoned underground mine.6 53 Following an unsuccessful appeal to the
Surface Mine Board (hereafter "SMB"), the appellees retained counsel and filed
a petition in the Kanawha County Circuit Court for judicial review of the SMB
decision. 654 However, three months later, DEP rescinded the permit upon Green
Valley's request. 65 5 After all briefs were submitted to the trial court, the appellees learned of the rescission and joined DEP in moving to dismiss the appeal
for judicial review.6 56 Upon appellees' motion, the trial court ordered DEP to
pay the citizens' attorney fees and costs. 657 This appeal involves the trial
court's order obliging DEP to pay the citizens' litigation costs.
In affirming portions of the trial court's judgment, the court first rejected DEP's contention that Green Valley was liable for "all or part of the costs
Green Valley
awarded, given• the fact that
•
•,,658 caused the resolution of the case by
The court found that "the only regurequesting that DEP rescind the permit.
latory basis for assessing attorney's fees against Green Valley is a violation of

650

551 S.E.2d 25 (W. Va. 2001).

651

See 551 S.E.2d at 25.

652

See W. VA. CODE ST. R. 2 § 20.12.

653

551 S.E.2d at 26.

654

Id.

655

Id.

656

Jd at 27.

657

Id.

658

Id at 29.
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WVSCMRA, the state regulations, or a permit issued thereunder." 6 59 Since the
court found that there had not been a violation in this case,
"there is no authority
660
for assessment of attorney's fees against Green Valley."
Next, the court concluded the term "judgment," as used in the West
Virginia Surface Mining regulations that govern administrative proceedings
determining when and how fees and costs may be awarded, includes "any order
that constitutes an ending of judicial participation in the matter in controversy,
whether by an agreed order of dismissal or otherwise." 66 1 Thus, the court approved of an otherwise appropriate award of costs and expenses made in actions
pursuant to the WVSCMRA, upon an agreed order of dismissal of an appeal
from the SMB, regardless of662the fact that the dismissal was unrelated to a
change in the DEP's position.
Lastly, in remanding the issue as to whether the appellees made a significant contribution to the determination of the issue, 663 the court propounded
to require the circuit court's order awarding costs and expenses pursuant to an
action under WVSCMRA to contain specific
findings of fact which provide
664
sufficient detail to provide appellate review.
G.

Changes in State Statutory EnvironmentalLaw
1.

Senate Bill 631

The West Virginia Legislature enacted chapter five-c of the code of
West Virginia creating the West Virginia Clean Coal Technology Act.665 In
enacting the Clean Coal Technology Act, the legislature created the West Virginia Clean Coal Technology Council to develop pilot projects relating to clean
coal and alternative coal use. In so doing, the legislature recognized coal as "an
important fuel source for keeping the household energy costs low in the state of
West Virginia" and vital to the economy of West Virginia.666 Also, the legislature acknowledged that the continued protection of the state's environment, public health and welfare, air quality, operation of existing industries and enhancement of long-term economic health required "that technologies be explored to
659

Id.

660

Id.

661

Id at 29-39.

662

Id.

663

Id. at 31.

664

Id. at 30.

665

S.B. 631, 2001 Leg., 75th Sess. (W. Va. 2001).

666

W. VA. CODE § 5C-2-1(a)(1).
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increase67 the efficiencies and decrease the emissions from electricity generated
'6

coal."

The Act provides that clean coal technologies and alternative coal use
be explored in order to: "(1) preserve fuel diversity and maintain reliable, lowcost sources of electric power; (2) identify technologies for reducing the emissions from existing coal electric generation; and (3) identify new, cleaner coalfired electric ' generation
technologies that may be used to provide new generat66 8
capacity.
ing
Section 5C-2-3 specifically creates the West Virginia Clean Coal Technology Council in which the legislature maintains oversight and is entrusted to
"coordinate actions for the study and development of clean coal technology pilot
projects" in West Virginia. 669 In addition, the Council is to be composed of
three state senators, three state delegates, two members representing coal operators, two members representing
coal miners and two members experienced in
670
the field of coal technology.
Some of the enumerated duties of the Council shall include: coordination of activities of the designated state agency with appropriate private, public,
state or federal agencies; direction to study, develop and promulgate requests for
pilot projects in West Virginia; and assessing technologies, economics, environmental benefits, and6 7the
importance of clean coal technologies to energy
1
policy in West Virginia.
2.

Senate Bill 574

In 2001, Senate Bill 574 was enacted to amend section twenty-two, article eleven, chapter twenty-two of the code of West Virginia. 672 The amendment
implemented two significant changes. First, the amendment increased the
maximum daily penalty for violations of the Act from $10,000 to $25,000 per
day. Second, the amendment included a new subsection, subsection b, instructing the director to propose, for legislative promulgation, rules to establish a
mechanism for administrative resolution of673
violations through consent orders or
agreements as an alternative to civil action.

667

§ 5C-2-1(b),

668

§ 5C-2- I(c).

669

§ 5C-2-3(a).

670

§ 5C-2-3(b).

671

§ 5C-2-5.

672

S.B. 574, 2001 Leg., 75th Sess. (W. Va. 2001).

673

W. VA. CODE § 22-11-22 (2001).
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Senate Bill 463

Senate Bill 463, enacted in 2001, amended article thirteen and thirteen-a
of chapter eleven of the West Virginia Code. 674 The Senate Bill added subsections two-f and three-e, to chapter eleven, article thirteen and thirteen-a, respectively.
Under chapter eleven, article thirteen, section two-f, every person manufacturing synthetic fuel from coal in the state of West Virginia for sale, profit, or
commercial use will be taxed at a rate of fifty cents per ton of synthetic fuel
manufactured. Synthetic fuel, as defined in this bill, includes fuel manufactured
from coal for which credit is allowable for federal income tax purposes under
section twenty-nine of the United States Internal Revenue Code, but does not
include coke or coke gas. The tax proceeds generated by this bill are to be deposited into a "Mining and Reclamation Operations Fund" and are to be used for
improving infrastructure and economic development.
Section three-e of chapter eleven, article thirteen-a imposes a tax on
"the business of extracting and recovering material from refuse, gob pile or
other sources of waste coal ... for sale, profit or commercial use.
The legislature imposed this tax, in "lieu of' the annual privilege tax typically imposed
on the severance of coal, to serve as an incentive to encourage the exploration
and development of "extracting and recovering coal material contained in re676
fuse, gob piles and other sources of waste coal located" in West Virginia.
The rate of the tax is "two and one-half percent of the gross value of the coal."
This tax will not be imposed on electrical power co-generation plants that burn
material from their own refuse or gob piles. Revenue generated by this tax will
be provided to the county commissions of the counties in which the refuse or
gob piles are located. These funds are to be used for economic development and
infrastructure improvements.
4.

Senate Bill 689

Senate Bill 689, enacted in 2001, amended sections thirteen-a, twentytwo-a, and thirty-a of article three, chapter twenty-two of the West Virginia
Code. 67 7 All of the amendments related to preblast survey and notification requirements under surface coal mining and reclamation act.
Significant amendments to section 22-3-13a include the following.
First, section (a)(3) was added. Section (a)(3) extended the pre-blasting notification requirement to surface-blasting activity conducted by operators involved
674

S.B. 463, 2001 Leg., 75th Sess. (W. Va. 2001).

675

W. VA. CODE § I 1-13a-3e (2001).

676

Id.

677

S.B. 689, 2001 Leg., 75th Sess. (W. Va. 2001).
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in underground mining operations. The last sentence of section (g) was changed
so that the office of explosives and blasting must provide a copy of the pre-blast
survey to owners and occupants; providing the pre-blast survey is not contingent
upon request by the owners or occupants. Section (j) was amended to reflect the
changes in section (a)(3). Prior to amendment, section (j) noted that "the provisions of this section shall not apply to ... the surface impacts of underground
mining methods." 678 The amended section now applies to surface-blasting activity conducted in conjunction with underground mining operations.
Most changes to Section 22-3-22a and section 22-3-30a were minor.
The ability to waive a "site-specific restriction within one thousand feet in writing" was removed from subsection (f) of section 22-3-22a.
5.

Senate Bill 603

Senate Bill 603 amended sections five, nine, and twelve of article two-a,
chapter five-b and section ten, article three, chapter twenty-two of the West Virginia Code. 679 All of the amendments related to the reclamation and economic
development of surface-mining sites.
Only minor amendments were made to section 5b-2a-5. Substantial
changes were made to section 5b-2a-9; subsection (f) was added. Under subsection (f), the Office of Coalfield Community Development "may secure developable land and infrastructure for a development office or county through the
preparation of a master land use plan. '68° State or local development authorities
"may determine land and infrastructure needs within their jurisdictions through
the development of a master land use plan. ' 68 1 All master land use plans must
be approved by the division of environmental protection and property donated
pursuant to a master land use plan cannot be accepted unless: "(a) The property
use is compatible with adjacent land uses; (b) the use satisfies the relevant development or redevelopment authority's anticipated need and market use; (c) the
property has in place necessary infrastructure components needed to achieve the
anticipated use; (d) the use is supported by all otehr appropriate public agencies;
(e) the property is eligible for bond release in accordance with section twentythree, article three, chapter twenty-two of [the] code; and (f) the use is feasi682
ble."
The amendment to section 5b-2a-12 was substantive and included the
addition of section (3). In accordance with this section, the Office of Coalfield
Community Development must propose rules for legislative approval concern2-3-13a (2001).

678

W. VA. CODE §

679

S.B. 603, 2001 Leg., 75th Sess. (W. Va. 2001).

680

W. VA. CODE § 5b-2a-9(f) (2001).

681

Id.
Id.

682
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ing "[c]riteria for the development of a master plan by local . . . authorities
which coordinates the permitting and reclamation 683
requirements of the division
authorities."
these
with
protection
of environmental
Michael A. Menzel, Jr.
Matthew A. Nelson
V.

A.

EVIDENCE

Introduction

During the previous term of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, the court was faced with several cases dealing with evidentiary issues.
Specifically, the court dealt with evidentiary issues in criminal appeals surrounding Rule 404(b), the admissibility of certain statements made by minors
while in custody, the admission of hearsay statements from unavailable witnesses, and gruesome photographs. Additionally, in the civil context, the court
analyzed the admissibility of certain expert testimony.
B.

Rule 404(b): Evidence of Other Crimes, Wrongs or Acts

The court gave further consideration to West Virginia Rule of Evidence
404(b) pertaining to evidence of other crimes, wrongs or Acts in State v.
Mc
6
Taniel.hat case arose from the defendant, David E. McDaniel, being
charged with sexual assault in the second degree and burglary. 685 At trial, the
State was permitted to call a witness who testified that the defendant broke into
her apartment in 1987 and raped her, although the crime was never reported and
the defendant was never charged. 6 86 Further, the defendant sought unsuccessfully to impeach 7this witness through the use of a prior conviction for "Com' 68
plicity in Theft.
The court began its analysis by ruling that "[t]he trial court judge must
carefully scrutinize the proffered Rule 404(b) evidence before allowing the evidence to be heard by the jury. Rule 404(b) evidence must be offered for a specific and legitimate purpose."
The court next reviewed the procedures that the trial court must follow
in evaluating such evidence. First, the trial judge is to conduct an in camera
683

W. VA. CODE § 5b-2a-12 (2001).

684

560 S.E.2d 484 (W. Va. 2001).

685

See id. at 486.

686

See id.

687

See id.

688

See id. at 488.
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hearing and after hearing arguments from both sides, must be satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that the acts or conduct was committed. 6 89 If a sufficient showing is made at this hearing, the trial court must next determine the
relevancy under Rule 401 and 402 followed by the required balancing test under
Rule 403.690 If the court is satisfied at this point that the evidence is admissible,
a jury instruction should be given on the limited purpose for which the evidence
has been admitted. 69 1 The court recommended that this limiting instruction be
given at the time the evidence is received and then repeated during the trial
court's general charge at the conclusion of the case.692
Turning to the merits of the case, the court determined that the conviction should be overturned because the state's purpose for offering the evidence
was not legitimate. 69 3 The state contended that alleged prior victim evidence
was to be offered to establish modus operandi.694 The court found that this evi695
dence is typically used when the identity of the defendant is in question.
Here, because the identity of the defendant was conceded and the two attacks
were factually distinguishable from one another, the court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for new trial. 6 9 6 Further, the court also ruled that not
to impeach the State's witness on her prior conviction
permitting the defendant
697
error.
constituted
also
The court was also given an opportunity to construe Rule 404(b) of the
West Virginia Rules of Evidence in State v. Johnson.698 This appeal arose out
of the conviction at trial of William Johnson of five counts of incest and five
counts of second degree sexual assault. 699 One of the chief issues on appeal was
of prior sexual assaults by
whether the trial court erred by admitting evidence
7
the defendant on the victim while living in Florida. 00
The court began its analysis by restating the policy behind Rule 404(b):

689

State v. McDaniel, 560 S.E.2d 484, 487 (W. Va. 2001).

690

See id.

691

See id.

692

See id.

693

See id.

694

See id. at 489

695

See id.

696

See id.

697

See id. at 490.

698

557 S.E.2d 811 (W. Va. 2001).

699

See id. at 815.

700

See id. at 816.
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[I]n the exercise of discretion to admit or exclude evidence of
collateral crimes and charges, the overriding considerations for
the trial court are to scrupulously protect the accused in his right
to a fair trial while adequately preserving the right of the State
to provide evidence which is relevant and legally connected
70
with the charge for which the accused is being tried. '
The court went on to hold that a determination of whether evidence of
prior bad acts should be admitted pursuant Rule 404(b) is to be done by an in
camera hearing before trial. 702 The trial judge must be convinced by a preponderance of the evidence that the crime was committed and also that the evidence
is relevant under Rules 401 and 402 and admitting it would not be a violation of
Rule 403 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence.703
After restating the appropriate standard, the court held that while the
trial court's analysis of this evidence may have been problematic, it was not
reversible error. 704 Specifically, the court noted that counsel for the defendant
failed to object to the introduction of this evidence of prior bad acts. 70 5 Further,
the court found that the plain error doctrine was inapplicable as the trial problems were probably best addressed in a habeas corpus proceeding because it
involved the performance of the defendant's trial counsel. '0
C.

Admissibility of Statements Made by Juveniles While in Custody

The West Virginia Legislature amended West Virginia Code section 495-2 governing Statements made by juveniles while in custody of the police. The
new statute provides that extrajudicial Statements made by a juvenile under
fourteen years of age while in custody are not admissible unless such Statements
are made in the presence of the juvenile's counsel. 70 7 Further, Statements made
by a juvenile over fourteen years of age but under sixteen years of age while in
custody are not admissible unless the juvenile's counsel or parent or guardian
are present. 70 8 If the parent or guardian is present but not the juvenile's counsel,
the Statements are admissible only if the parent or guardian are advised of the
701

Id. at 817.

702

See id. at 817-18.

703

State v. Johnson, 557 S.E.2d 811, 818 (W. Va. 2001).

704

See id.

705

See id.

706

See id. at 818-19.

707

See W. VA. CODE § 49-5-2(1) (2001).

708

See id.
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full range°9 of the child's rights guaranteed by the State and United States Constitutions.
D.

Admission of Hearsay Statements From Unavailable Witnesses

In State v. Ladd,7 10 the court was faced with the determination of the
admission of hearsay statements using the 804(b)(3) exception for unavailable
witness. Ladd arose out of the conviction of Robin Ladd in Jackson County for
conspiring to murder her husband.7 11 One of the numerous errors alleged by the
defendant on appeal was that the trial court erred by admitting out of court
Statements by two witnesses because they were unavailable for trial because
their respective attorneys were either members of the State legislature or designated employees. 7 12 The trial court allowed these Statements to be admitted
because it found that the Statements fell under Statements against interest pursuant to Rule 804(b)(3) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence. 7 13 The defendant alleged on appeal that allowing such Statements pursuant
to 804(b)(3) vio7 14
Clause.
Confrontation
the
under
rights
lated the defendant's
While noting at the outset that the appellee conceded at oral argument
that the admission of these Statements constituted plain error that warranted
reversal of at least one of the three convictions of the appellant, 7 15 the court
went on to analyze when such out-of-court Statements may be admitted. 7 16 The
court found that extrajudicial testimony may be nonetheless admitted without
violation of the Confrontation Clause by the State "(1) demonstrating the unavailability of the witness to testify; and (2) proving the reliability of the witness's out-of-court Statement." 7 17 Further, the court held that the reliability
prong of this test may .be 7 inferred
"where the evidence falls within a firmly
18
rooted hearsay exception."
The court then reiterated that Rule 804(b)(3) is
709
710

See id.
557 S.E.2d 820 (W. Va. 2001).

711

See id. at 829-30.

712

See id. at 833. West Virginia Code section 4-1-17 exempts either State legislators or em-

ployees of the Legislature from appearing in trials or tribunals if such trials or tribunals conflict
with legislative proceedings and for certain times before an after legislative proceedings. See W.
VA. CODE § 4-1-17 (2001).
713

See Ladd, 557 S.E.2d at 833.

714

See id.

715

See id. at 836.

716

See id.

717

Id. at syl. pt. 8.

718

Id. at 834 (quoting State v. James Edward S, 400 S.E.2d 843, 849, syl. pt. 5 (W. Va. 1990)).
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not a firmly rooted hearsay exception. 7 19 Thus, the admission of such Statements constituted error on the part of the circuit court. 72 In fact, the court determined that because the admission of such Statements violated the defendant's
rights under the Confrontation Clause, the prejudicial
impact of such an admis• - 721
convictions.
her
of
all
of
reversal
sion warranted
E.

Gruesome Photographs

The court was presented with another opportunity to analyze Rule 403
as it applies to gruesome crime scene photographs in State v. Carey.722 This
involved a murder case where the victim was stabbed several times and then
shot twice. 723 The state attempted to introduce numerous photographs, including prints of the victim and also pictures of the knife, gun, and several articles of
the defendant's clothing that were physically introduced into evidence as
well. 7 24 It was noted at the outset that prior to trial, the circuit court conducted a
hearing outside the presence of the jury and determine which
photographs could
725
be admitted and which photographs could not be admitted.
The court affirmed this conviction, finding that the circuit court analyzed the evidence properly under Rule 403 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence. 72 6 The court restated again727that the admissibility of such photographs
is
•728
to be determined under Rule 403
and done on a case-by-case basis.
Further, the court held that the "balancing test [under Rule 403] is essentially a matter of trial c duct, a.d the trial court's discration. will. not be overt ed absent
' 729 Finding no such clear abuse of discretion, the
a showing of clear abuse."
730
affirmed.
was
conviction
719

See id.

720

See id.

721

See id. at 844.

722

558 S.E.2d 650 (W. Va. 2001).

723

See id. at 654.

724

See id.

725

See id. at 655.

726

See id.

727

Rule 403 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence restricts this liberal policy of admission of

relevant evidence by requiring evidence to be excluded if its prejudicial impact outweighs its
probative effect. See W. VA. R. EvID. 403.
728
State v. Carey, 558 S.E.2d at 656. (W. Va. 2001).
729

See id.

730

See id. at 663.
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Expert Testimony

F.

In Watson v. Inco Alloys Int'l, Inc.,7 3 1 the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals concluded that the question of admissibility of expert testimony under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,732 and Wilt v. Buracker,733 will only
be applicable if the testimony deals with scientific knowledge. 734 If the expert
testimony is considered technical in nature, a court should not apply the Daubert
gatekeeper analysis. 735 Additionally, expert testimony7 36in the field of engineering is generally considered technical and not scientific.
However, in Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael,the United States Supreme Court determined that the gatekeeper function of Daubert was not limited
to scientific knowledge but also applied to expert testimony based on technical
or other specialized knowledge. 73 Based on Daubert and Kumho Tire, Rule
702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence was amended to read:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is
based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the
product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness
has applied
the principles and methods reliably to the facts of
738
the case.
rule.7 39

However, West Virginia has declined to adopt the revised federal
Instead, West Virginia's Rule governing expert testimony States:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,

731

545 S.E.2d 294 (W. Va. 2001).

732

509 U.S. 579 (1993).

733

443 S.E.2d 196 (W. Va. 1993).

734

See Watson, 545 S.E.2d at 296.

735

See id.

736

See id. at 300 (citing Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 148 (1999)).

737

See id.

738

FED. R. EvID.

739

See Watson, 545 S.E.2d at 300.

702
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may testify thereto in
skill, experience, training, or education
740
the form of an opinion or otherwise.
Therefore, the witness must be qualified as an expert, testify to scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge, and the testimony must assist the
trier of fact. 74 1 The court concluded that any questions of reliability concerning
the expert's opinion goes to the weight of the evidence and not its admissibililty. 742

J. ChristopherGardill
Ashley Wilkinson

740

W. VA. R. EvID. 702.

741

See Watson, 545 S.E.2d at 302.
See id. at 303.

742
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